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CHALLENGING MEDICARE PART B AMOUNT
DETERMINATIONS: THE TRANSCENDENCE OF
THE REASONABLE CHARGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Before 1987, Medicare Part B beneficiaries were precluded from
judicial review of all benefit amount determinations. Under the Social
Security Amendments of 1965,1 judicial review was available to persons
challenging their entitlement to both Part A and Part B benefits, but
enrolled beneficiaries could only challenge "the determination of the
amount of benefits under [P]art A" in a federal court.2 Therefore, a Part
B beneficiary could seek relief only by administrative appeal. 3
The administrative-appeal procedures of a Part B benefit amount
determination consists of a two-tier review process.' First, a dissatisfied
claimant has to request a de novo review conducted by the Medicare Part
B carrier.5 Second, the claimant can request a statutory "fair hearing" 6
conducted by an "officer designated by the appropriate official of the
carrier.' The hearing officer may be an employee of the Part B carrier. 8
According to the regulations, this hearing is a forum of last resort because
"[t]he hearing officer's decision ... shall be final and binding upon all
parties to the hearing.'"
In 1982, the Supreme Court found this review procedure
constitutional."0 The Court held that this "fair hearing" did not deny due
process because the presumption, without factual findings to the contrary,
1. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 290.
2. Id. § 1869(a), 79 Stat. at 330.
3. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.801-.872 (1991) (establishing procedures for review
and hearings of appeals under Medicare Part B).
4. See id.
5. See id. §§ 405.807-.812. A Medicare carrier is defined as "an organization which
has entered into a contract with the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] pursuant to
section 1842 of the [Social Security] Act and which is authorized to make determinations
with respect to Part B of title XVIII of the Social Security Act." Id. § 405.802(a).
6. § 1842(b)(3)(C), 79 Stat. at 310-11 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C)

(1988)).
7. 42 C.F.R. § 405.823.
8. Id. § 405.824.
9. Id. § 405.835.
10. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
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was that a hearing officer was unbiased." Furthermore, in a different
case decided on the same day, 12 the Court held that, based on statutory
language, congressional intent, and legislative history, there was no
federal subject-matter jurisdiction for review of 'Part B amount
determinations.1 3 The Court concluded that Congress foreclosed judicial
review because "payments under the Part B program generally were
4
expected to be smaller than those under the primary Part A program. "1
In 1986, however, the Court, operating under a "strong presumption
that Congress intend[ed] judicial review of administrative action,"" 5 held
that challenges to the validity of the administrative regulations, which
established the methodology used to determine the amount of benefits,
were not judicially foreclosed by Congress. ' 6 In the same year, Congress
amended the Social Security Act and permitted appeal to an administrative
law judge (AIJ) under Part B if the amount in controversy was not less
than $500 and judicial review if the aggregate amount in controversy was
not less than $1000. '1 The fair-hearing requirement was also amended to
reflect this change.'"
One year later, Congress amended the new Part B fair-hearing
requirement by changing the statute's phrasing. 9 Congress also
authorized the General Accounting Office to "conduct a study concerning
the cost effectiveness of requiring [fair] hearings . . . before having a
hearing before an administrative law judge."' One circuit court
interpreted this as requiring a complete exhaustion of administrative
remedies before any review by a federal court. 2' Thus, judicial review
of Part B amount determinations, albeit not foreclosed, is certainly
11. See id. at 195.
12. See United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201 (1982).
13. See id. at 206-11.
14. Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
15. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 671 (1986).
16. See id. at 670.
17. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509,
§ 9341(a)(1)(C), 100 Stat. 2037, 2037.
18. Id. § 9341(a)(2), 100 Stat. at 2038. The fair-hearing requirement was changed
from amounts in controversy of "$100 or more" to amounts of "at least $100, but not more
than $500." Id.
19. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §
4085(i)(5), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-130 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C)
(1988)). The new law changed the wording from "not more than $500" to "less than
$500." Id.
20. Id. § 4082(d), 101 Stat. at 1330-128.
21. See Isaaes v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1989).
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forestalled.' The net effect-particularly because the beneficiaries are
not only elderly but also, as evidenced by the filing of a claim, in need of

medical service-is tantamount to foreclosure because time and the ability
to maintain the review process work against senior citizens.
In 1986, while addressing the issues of judicial review of Medicare
Part B amount determinations, Congress created the Physician Payment

Review Commission to investigate and analyze physician charges under
the Part B program.'

Congress also authorized the Secretary of Health

and Human Resources (HHS) to develop a national fee schedule for
physician charges for use with the Part B program'8 Three years later,

Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,1
which directed the HHS Secretary to establish a national fee schedule for
physician charges under Medicare Part B.1 On November 25, 1991, the
Secretary issued regulations to implement the new payment method
effective January 1, 1992.27
Meanwhile, the states were also addressing the issue of Medicare Part

B amount determinations.

Under a concept called

"mandatory

assignment," some state legislatures imposed restrictions on a physician's

ability to charge Medicare beneficiaries.'

Some states, such as

22. In order to exhaust all the administrative remedies, a beneficiary must file a claim,
receive an initial determination, request a review, receive a review determination, request
a fair hearing, take part in a fair hearing, receive a fair-hearing determination, request an
ALJ hearing (for amounts more than $500), take part in an AJ hearing, and receive an
A.J decision, before any challenge involving claims in aggregate of $1000 would be
entitled to judicial review. The Second Circuit estimated the time between the initiation of
a claim and completion of AUJ review to be nineteen months and stated that this was not
"remarkable in the Medicare, Social Security and employment benefits systems." Id. at
477.
23. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99272, § 9305(a), 100 Stat. 190 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-I (1988)).
24. See id. § 9305(e)(1), 100 Stat. at 192.
25. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106.
26. Id. § 6102, 103 Stat. at 2169-70.
27. See 56 Fed. Reg. 59,502 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 405, 413, 415).
28. See generally Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 637 F. Supp. 684, 701-03
(D. Mass. 1986) (discussing the effects of mandatory assignment legislation), aff'd, 815
F.2d 790 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987); Peter J. Strauss, Law and the
Aging: Legislative Update, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 31, 1990, at 3 (discussing mandatory assignment
laws in New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Vermont).
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Connecticut,' Massachusetts,' and Pennsylvania,31 require physicians
to accept the Medicare Part B amount determination as payment in full.
Others, such as New York, impose levels that limit a physician from
charging a Medicare beneficiary more than a statutory percentage of the
Part B amount determination .2 Still other states, while not imposing
mandatory assignment, require physicians to notify beneficiaries that they
are liable for payments in excess of the Medicare Part B determination."
At issue in any challenge to a Part B amount determination is the
reimbursement amount due the beneficiary. This note examines the issues
presented when a Medicare Part B carrier partially reimburses a
beneficiary-either directly or indirectly-for a covered medical expense.
Partial reimbursement occurs because "Medicare pays no more for Part
B medical and other health services than the 'reasonable charge' for such
service."' This payment standard is not based on the actual charge
incurred by the beneficiary, but on what the carrier determines to be
"reasonable." The first issue, therefore, is whether the federal statutes,
regulations, and carrier-made rules that create and utilize a "reasonablecharge" payment standard are valid. If so, the second issue is whether the
beneficiary or the provider of service is liable for the difference between
the charge actually billed and the reimbursement made by the carrier. If
the providers are liable, the final issue is whether a valid constitutional
challenge to the complete regulation of medical fees exists. The resolution
of these issues will help determine the shape of health-care delivery
systems into the twenty-first century.
Part II of this note presents a general background of the Medicare
system and compares it to other national health-service programs. Part III
examines the statutory authority of the reasonable charge and how the
issues of Part B amount determinations have been resolved by federal
courts. Part IV focuses on both federal and state actions limiting physician
charges. Finally, Part V addresses the national fee schedule that went into
effect on January 1, 1992. This note concludes that the reasonable charge
has survived as a legal concept, but has transcended into a governmentimposed fee schedule. It is this fee schedule which most likely will shape
health-care reform in the 1990s.

29. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-391 (West 1992).
30. MASs. GEN. L. ch. 112, § 2 (Supp. 1991).

31.
32.
33.
(1991);
34.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 449.34 (Supp. 1992).
N:Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 19 (McKinney Supp. 1992).
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-5-901 (1991); OR. REV. STAT.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-22 (Supp. 1991).
42 C.F.R. § 405.501(a) (1991).

§ 677.099
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II. THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF MEDICARE

A. Origins
In order to effectively analyze the legal issues concerning the
reasonable charge, it is necessary to understand the formation of, and
subsequent changes in, the federal program commonly called "Medicare."
Medicare is this country's late entry into the world's compulsory healthinsurance arena. 5 Although the demands for government involvement in
a national health-insurance scheme date back to the beginning of the
twentieth century, Medicare did not become a legislative reality until
1965.6
Although socialized medicine had been proposed after World War I,
and was advocated by some during the 1920s, opposition by such groups
as the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Federation
of Labor prevented the United States from following England's example
of government health insurance for low-income workers.37 But by the
1930s, the economic climate had created such national pressures that
socialized medicine once again was put on the nation's agenda.3 8
President Roosevelt's advisory Committee on Economic Security, created
in 1934 to draft Social Security legislation, broached the subject of
government health insurance as part of the overall program. 39 Roosevelt's
fear, however, that this controversial issue would hurt the passage of his
Social Security bill and his chances for re-election kept him from
vigorously sponsoring any such program. 40
Meanwhile, the Great Depression had created serious problems for the
medical community. 41 During the 1930s, the American Hospital
Association created a non-profit, tax-exempt insurance program called
"Blue Cross," which offered private limited health insurance to
workers.42 The purpose of the Blue Cross program was to establish a
prepayment mechanism" to ensure a stable source of revenue for
35. THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLMCS OF MEDICARE 7 (1973).
36. See id.
37. See id. at 7-8. The American Federation of Labor feared that government health
insurance would serve as an excuse for government control of the work force. Id. at 7.
38. See id. at 8.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 8-9.
41. See Sylvia A. Law & Barry Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians' Fees: Individual
Patients or Society? (A Case Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1986).
42. See id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

hospitals, particularly when treating lower- and middle-income patients.
The Blue Cross plan used a service benefit feature in which hospitals
45
agreed to accept payments based upon
a fee
The hospitals
not from patients.
and schedule."
Cross
Blue
from
directly
payment
received
The AMA, on the other hand, maintained that medical ethics would
only permit health insurance that would pay patients directly. Arguably
there could never be a direct relationship between the physician and the
insurer.' Yet, by World War II, the AMA had retreated from this
position, and the Blue Shield program, patterned after Blue Cross, was
created and implemented by individual state medical societies. 47
Both Blue Cross and Blue Shield were community-rated plans that
allowed all people in the community to pay a similar rate.48 This form
of health insurance became available to a broad spectrum of working
people, although there was no effort to help the unemployed and the
poor.49 In contrast, by 1940, no western European country was without
a government health-insurance program, at least for low-income
workers."
Throughout the 1940s, compulsory health insurance remained a
national issue.51 It was not until President Truman was re-elected in
1948, however, that it became a lead item on the administration's
agenda.5 2 Truman's administration was less concerned with income
security than Roosevelt's New Deal Administration had been.53 Instead,
Truman's administration focused on the access-to-care problem caused by
the inequitable distribution of medical services.' In 1949, Truman
43. See id.
44. See id. at 10.
45. See id. at 9.
46. Id.
47. See id.; see also MARMOR, supra note 35, at 9 (stating that the reason the AMA
reversed its position opposing private health insurance, which paid doctors directly, was
to forestall federal action on any kind of socialized medicine).
48. See Law & Ensminger, supra note 41, at 10.
49. See id.
50. See MARMOR, supra note 35, at 7.
51. See id. at 9-10.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. Marmor stated:
[t]he proponents of Truman's compulsory insurance program took for granted
that financial means should not determine the quality and quantity of medical
services a citizen received. "Access to the means of attainment and preservation
of health," the 1953 report of Truman's Commission on the Health Needs of the
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mounted a vigorous campaign to secure congressional enactment of
universal government health insurance.55 The AMA vehemently fought
this campaign, characterizing socialized medicine as an "impersonal
medical world.., in which patients and doctors were forced unwillingly
upon each other."' In the end, the AMA prevailed over Truman.
Truman nevertheless persistently requested compulsory health
insurance during the remaining years of his second term. 7 The 1949
failure to enact a universal health-insurance program, however, along with
subsequent failures in 1950 and 1951, demonstrated that a broad program
would never succeed. 8 Toward the end of his Administration, Truman
revamped his compulsory health-insurance program by eliminating the
access-to-care issue and concentrating solely on the medical needs of
Social Security recipients.5 9
Consequently, socialized medicine in the United States is currently
only for the elderly and this makes it unlike any other program in the
world. No other industrialized society has compulsory health insurance
only for its senior citizens.' In addition, no other compulsory healthinsurance program ever began with such a beneficiary group. The standard
had been to cover either the work force or the poor.61
Choosing senior citizens was a logical solution to Truman's political
problem. The elderly, like widows and orphans, commanded public
sympathy, and the statistical data proving them sicker and poorer than the
rest of society was formidable and readily available.62 Moreover, postwar
growth in health insurance was uneven.' Compared to the rest of the
Nation flatly stated, "is a basic human right." The health insurance problem in
this view was the degree to which the use of health services varied with income
(and not simply illness). In contrast, for those who considered minimum
accessibility of health services a standard of adequacy, the provision of charity
medicine in doctors' offices and general hospitals represented a solution, and the
problem was to fill in where present charity care was unavailable.
Id. at 10. (quoting [sic] PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON THE HEALTH NEEDS OF THE NAnON,
BUILDING AMERICA'S HEALTH, H.R. Doc. 55, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1965)).
55. See id.at 11-12.
56. Id. at 13.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 13-14.
60. THEODORE R. MARMOR, Coping with a Creeping Crisis: Medicare at Twenty, in
SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE RHEToRIC OF CRISIS 177, 178 (Theodore R. Marmor &
Jerry L. Mashaw eds., 1988) [hereinafter MARMOR, Creeping Crisis].
61. See id.
62. See MARMOR, supra note 35, at 16.
63. See id.
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population, a lower proportion of the aged were covered, and the coverage

that existed was limited.( 4 This created a strong health-insurance need for
senior citizens. Additionally, the lack of insurance protection made the

elderly dependent on their children for financial assistance. Therefore, this
new program could seek broad political support by appealing to the
families of the aged.'
Truman's new program, now called Medicare, came much too late in

his Administration for any chance of success. When the Republicans
recaptured the White House in 1952, after a twenty-year hiatus, they
shelved Medicare because the program had no political sponsorship in
either the House or the Senate.' Moreover, President Eisenhower

himself had campaigned against socialized medicine.67 It was not until the

election of John F. Kennedy, who included a hospital-insurance program

for the aged as part of his "New Frontier," that the program was
revitalized.'
In his first year in office, President Kennedy attempted to enact his
version of the Medicare program into law, but a combination of AMA
lobbying and solid opposition by the Southern Democrats defeated the bill
in the Ways and Means Committee.' This defeat, however, did not

weaken the proposal but instead strengthened its viability. Support for
Medicare grew over the next several years.7' With the 1964 landslide
election creating a mandate, pursuant to President Johnson's "Great
Society," Medicare was signed into law on July 30, 1965."
64. See id. at 16-17.
65. See id.at 17.
66. See id. at 29.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 39.
69. Id.at 40-54.
To forestall action in Congress, the A.M.A. and AMPAC [the American
Medical Political Action Committee] stepped up their campaigns. The women's
auxiliary was the first to attack. In a program called Operation Coffee Cup,
thousands of doctors' wives held afternoon parties for friends and neighbors, at
which they ate cookies, drank coffee, and listened to a recording of a talk by
Ronald Reagan. "One of the traditional methods of imposing statism or Socialism
on a people has been by way of medicine," Reagan assured his listeners, and he
urged the ladies to write letters, and get their friends to write letters, to members
of Congress. "If you don't do this," he said, "one of these days you and I are
going to spend our sunset years telling our children and our children's children
what it once was like in America when men were free."
RICHARD HARRIS, A SACRED TRUST 139 (1966) (quoting Ronald Reagan).
70. See MARMOR, supra note 35, at 54-57.
71. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286. President
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B. Structure
Medicare is divided into two distinct programs: the Hospital Insurance
Benefits for the Aged (HI)n and the Supplementary Medical Insurance
Benefits for the Aged (SMI).73 Together, these two programs form Title
XVIII of the Social Security Act, known as the "Health Insurance for the
Aged." 74 Title XVIII is divided into three parts: (1) "Part A" pertains to
HI; (2) "Part B" pertains to SMI; and (3) "Part C" concerns the
miscellaneous provisions applicable to both programs.75
The fundamental structure of Medicare has not changed since its
enactment in 1965.76 All amendments to the overall program have
maintained the individual integrity of Parts A and B.' Although once
under the authority of the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the
former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Medicare is now
administered
by HHS through the Health Care Financing Administration
78
(HCFA).
Although Part B is the focus of this note, it is important to understand
several aspects of the Part A program that are organically different from
Part B. Part A is a mandatory program financed by the Federal Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund through the appropriation of Social Security
taxes.79 Primarily, it covers hospital, skilled-nursing facility, homeJohnson, along with 200 of the nation's leaders, held the signing ceremony in
Independence, Mo., in the presence of Harry Truman, in order to honor the former
president. RASHI FEIN, MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL COSTS 68 (1986). At the ceremony,
Johnson declared that "no longer will illness crush and destroy the [life] savings [of older

Americans]." John D. Morris, President Signs Medicare Bills; Praises Truman, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 31, 1965, at Al.
72. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1801, 79 Stat. 286,
291-301 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to 1395i-4 (1988)).
73. Id. § 1801, 79 Stat. at 301-13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395k to 1395w4
(1988)).

74. § 1801, 79 Stat. at 291.
75. Id. This note follows the common usage of referring to HI as "Part A" and SMI
as "Part B."
76. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988) (setting forth regulations for
health insurance for the aged and disabled).
77. See generally id.
78. See MARMOR, Creeping Crisis, supra note 60, at 188. "[I]n 1977 ... [HCFA]
was created . . . to administer both Medicare and Medicaid, thereby releasing Medicare
from the SSA's managerial ethos and bureaucratic style." Id.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i (creating the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund and

describing the administration and management of the fund).
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health, and hospice-care expenses.'o The provider of service-usually a
hospital-must be Medicare certified. 8' It is the provider, not the
beneficiary, who interacts with an intermediary, such as Blue Cross or an
insurance company, to secure payment. The only requirement for
beneficiaries to receive Medicare benefits is for them to use a Medicarecertified facility.' Any benefit paid to the provider is subject to a
deductible and coinsurance, which becomes the beneficiary's liability.'
In 1983, the claim process for Part A changed from a retrospectivepayment or reimbursement system to a prospective-payment system
(PPS)." All beneficiaries are assigned to a diagnosis-related group
(DRG) when admitted to a hospital. Medicare payments are then paid by
HCFA through the intermediaries based upon the DRG assigned, not the
services performed.' Thus, a person admitted to a hospital for a specific
condition is classified by a specific DRG. Under this classification, the
provider is entitled to a fixed amount, regardless of the services provided
and the number of days the patient is confined to a hospital.5 6
Part B is a voluntary, federally subsidized health-insurance program,
financed by the Federal Supplementary Insurance Trust Fund.8 7 Part B
is available to any individual entitled to Part A benefits.88 Beneficiaries
pay a monthly premium that is deducted from their Social Security"
benefit." Basically, Part B covers physician services, diagnostic tests,
outpatient hospital services, inpatient or outpatient radiology and pathology
services, x-rays, drugs and biologicals that cannot be self-administered,
transfusions, medical supplies, physical and occupational therapy, speechpathology services, ambulance services, and limited chiropractic,
podiatric, psychiatric, dental, and optometric services.'g The program
80.
81.
82.
various

See id. § 1395d.
See id. § 1395ce.
See generally id. §§ 1395f-1395h (describing the conditions and limitations of
types of payment methods for services rendered).

83. Id. § 1395e. The statute provides a formula to compute the yearly deductibles and
coinsurance. See id.; see also Patrick B. Nemom & Jeanne Finberg, MCAA Updates:
QualifiedMedicare Beneficiariesand Restrictive MedicaidRules, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
601, 601 n.8 (1991) (stating that in 1992- beneficiaries shall pay a "$652 deductible per
benefit period; [and] $163 in coinsurance, for each day after the 60th day of
hospitalization").
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id.
See id.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j, 1395t (1988).
See id. § 1395o.
Id. § 1395s(a).
90. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVs., Pub.
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only covers services that are medically reasonable and necessary. It
excludes routine, preventative, and non-skilled custodial care.9' Because
Part B payments, unlike Part A, are based on service charges, not service
locations, no requirement exists that service providers be "Medicare
certified."9' Medicare Part B beneficiaries are free to choose their own
doctors. 3 Whether the beneficiary is reimbursed, and for what amount,
depends on the service performed.
The Part B claim-processing procedure is also different than Part A.
Like Part A, .the HI-S Secretary contracts with private organizations,
called carriers instead of intermediaries, for the administration of Part B
benefits. 4 The major carriers are Blue Cross and Blue Shield, although
there are some commercial insurers such as Aetna, Travelers, and
Nationwide that have Part B contracts. 95
Unlike Part A, Part B claims are paid retrospectively, and the
reimbursement is based on the "approved" or "reasonable charges" for the
service.' The beneficiary must absorb an annual deductible before any
benefits are paid.97 After the deductible is met, reimbursement is paid
subject to a coinsurance which is generally eighty percent."
Medicare Part B was never structured to reimburse a beneficiary on
a dollar-for-dollar basis but instead was designed to generally pay only
eighty cents on the dollar. More importantly, no cap currently exists on
this coinsurance amount. 9 Thus, even if a beneficiary is liable for only
twenty percent of Part B services, an extended or expensive illness could
still "crush and destroy" a beneficiary's savings." ° Moreover, this
structure increases a beneficiary's personal liability by the difference
between the actual charge billed and the reasonable charge approved. 101
No. 10050, THE MEDICARE HANDBOOK 13-19 (1989) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]; see also
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-1395n (Supp. 1988 and 1990) (codifying Medicare provisions).
91. HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at 4-15, 22.
92. See id. at 1-2, 4.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (1988).
94. See id. § 1395u(a).
95. See HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at 33-37.
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id. at 14.
98. Id. Certain services, such as diagnostic tests and second opinions, have a
coinsurance of 100%, meaning full reimbursement. See 42 U.S.C. § 13951(a)(1)(D) (1988).
99. The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 201,
102 Stat. 683, 700, which would have capped out-of-pocket expenses at $1370.00 (subject
to increases) was repealed by the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979, 1981.
100. Beyond Medicare, CONSUMER REPORTS, June 1989, at 375.
101. For example, a beneficiary incurs a $100 medical expense. If $100 is the
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C. Statistics
National health expenditures were $666.2 billion in 1990, $602.8

billion in 1989, $546 billion in 1988, and $494.1 billion in 1987.1° This
represents an increase of 10.5% in 1990, 10.4% in 1989, and 10.5% in

1988. This also represents a 266% increase since 1980 and an 895%
increase since 1970."°3 Of greater importance, national health
expenditures represented 12.2% of the gross national product in 1990, t°1
compared to 9.2% in 1980 and 7.3% in 1970.105
Of this $666.2 billion, $585.3 billion was spent on personal health

care." ° Personal health care is defined as "all spending for health

services received by individuals and health products purchased in retail

outlets."" ° For personal health care, Medicare paid out $108.9 billion
on approximately 26.6 million of the approximately 34.2 million

enrollees."0 8 The $108.9 billion can be broken down to Part A payments

for hospital services of $68.3 billion, representing almost 63% of total

personal health-care expenditures," ° and to Part B payments for
physician services of $30 billion or 27.5%. ° Although Part B
approved charge, and the deductible has been met, then the beneficiary is reimbursed $80
if the coinsurance rate is 80%. But if the approved charge is only $60, then the
reimbursement is only $48 ($60 x 80% = $48). The beneficiary's personal liability
increases from $20 to $52 ($100 - $48 = $52), when the ceiling is $60.
If a beneficiary has a Medicare supplemental policy (Medigap) from a private insurer,
the personal liability may still be substantial because these policies usually only pay 20%
of the approved charge. Id. at 382-85. Thus, in the above example, a beneficiary with a
Medigap policy would receive a 100% reimbursement if $100 were approved. A $60
approved charge, however, would still leave the beneficiary with a $40 out-of-pocket
expense, because only $48 ($60 X 80%) would be paid by Medicare and only $12 ($60 X
20%) would be paid by the Medigap insurer. Without a ceiling on this out-of-pocket
expense, the beneficiary's potential liability could be in the tens of thousands of dollars.
102. Katharine R. Levit et a., National health expenditures, 1990, HEALTH CARE FIN.
REV., Fall 1991, at 29, 29.
103. See id. at 47-48.
104. Id. at 29.
105. Id. at 46. The Commerce Department recently estimated 1992 health-care
expenditures at $838.5 billion and projected 1993 expenditures at $939.9 billion. Robert
Peer, Health-Care Costs Up Sharply Again, Posing New Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993,
at Al, A10. Of greater significance is that the Commerce Department estimates that 1992
expenditures represented over 14 percent of the 1992 Gross National Product. Id.
106. Levit et al., supra note 102, at 53.
107. Id. at 30.
108. Id. at 41.
109. Id. at 39.
110. Id.
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expenditures are considerably less than Part A expenditures, $30 billion
is still a substantial sum to a debt-ridden nation.' 1 '
In 1986, Medicare Part B was the nation's fourth-largest entitlement
program after Social Security, Medicare Part A, and Medicaid.' 2
Moreover, it was the fastest growing major domestic spending
program."' This trend is likely to continue because the Medicare
population of the United States is increasing at a rate of about two percent
per year, compared to the general population, which is increasing at about
one percent per year."" The shifts in health-care delivery systems from
inpatient to outpatient further strengthen this trend." 5
Although 1990 Medicare expenditures were $30 billion for physician
services," 6 this figure does not include the Part B deductible and the
20% coinsurance that Part B does not pay." 7 Medicare Part B
beneficiaries were responsible for $2.66 billion in total deductibles and
$7.5 billion in coinsurance payments."' This does not include the
liabilities of Medicare Part B beneficiaries for physician charges above the
reasonable charge. About 25% of all Part B claims involve some excess
charges, and this figure continues to mount." 9
D. Health Insurance Versus Health Service
Medicare did not create a national health service, but rather a limited
national health-insurance program.'12 The program was not designed to
fulfill most Americans' notions of socialized medicine where a nationwide
administrative structure dispenses medical care that all citizens, regardless
111. "Medicare spending for physician services increased 9.5 percent from 1989,
reaching $30.0 billion in 1990. Medicare's share of total spending for physician services
grew from 11.8 percent in 1970 to 19.0 percent in 1980 and 23.9 percent in 1990." Id. at
40.
112. Law & Ensminger, supra note 41, at 2 (quoting OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PAYMENT FOR PHYSICIAN SERVICES 3 (1986)).
113. See id.
114. Levit et al., supra note 102, at 41, 46.
115. Id. at 42.
116. Id. at 53.
117. Id. at 33.
118. Id. at 39 (26.6 million users x $100 deductible = $2.66 billion; $30 billion +
80% = $37.5 billion; $37.5 billion - $30 billion = $7.5 billion).
119. Beyond Medicare, supra note 100, at 377.
120. See William A. Glaser, "SocializedMedicine" in Practice, in NATIONAL HEALTH
CARE 41 (Ray H. Elling ed., 1971).
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of their status as workers or taxpayers, have a right to use.121 Medicare,
both Parts A and B, is an insurance program. It does not provide payment
for all medical expenses because the "insurance" philosophy of medicalcare financing is to pay sufficient and substantial portions of health-care
costs, as compared to a "prepayment" philosophy that seeks to separate
financing from medical considerations.' "
The Medicare program's structure is similar to health-insurance
programs of the 1950s and early 1960s." z These programs were
provided by employers to their employees under employee-benefit
plans." These plans, usually contracted with the local Blue Cross
organization, primarily consisted of a basic hospital-service plan because
health-care delivery was-at that time-hospital based."z This was the
model that Part A used. Some employee-benefit plans had a Blue Shield
component that provided additional service benefits for physician services
performed in the hospital. 1 Part B, however, was not modeled after
those Blue Shield plans. 2 7 Instead, the program was modeled after the
supplemental health plans, offered by commercial insurers to employers,
that "wrapped around" the basic hospital program. 12 These plans
featured an indemnity benefit, paid directly to the insured.'2 The
reimbursements were for excesses not paid by the basic hospital plan."' °
Thus, Part B historically has been regarded as a secondary program of
minor importance-and still is by many.' But based on the factors
stated above, Part B Medicare has been increasing in economic, political,
and legal importance over the last ten years.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE REASONABLE CHARGE
A. Statutory Analysis of the Reasonable Charge
After the 1964 election, with Medicare a legislative certainty, one of
the core issues in formulating the Part B program was the method of
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See id.
See MARMOR, supra note 35, at 78.
See id.
See Law & Ensminger, supra note 41, at 10.
See MARMOR, supra note 35, at 80.
Id.
Id.at 11.
Id.
Id.at 10-11.
Id.at 80.
See United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 208 (1982).
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physician payment.132 To satisfy the AMA and to enlist the support of
133
the medical profession, a Blue Cross-type fee schedule was avoided.
Congress feared that physicians would act on their repeated threats of noncooperation in implementing Part B. 1" Instead, the program allowed
physicians to be paid their "usual and customary" fee, but with a condition
that the fee be "reasonable."135 Moreover, the program had no
proscription against charging a Medicare beneficiary a fee higher than this
"reasonable" fee and did not require physicians to interact with carriers
because benefits-in the form of reimbursements-were to be paid directly
to the beneficiary." Thus, the program enabled physicians to charge
their patients more than what Medicare may have deemed reasonable. 37
Congressional sympathy for physicians' distaste of government control,
coupled with the fear that restrictive fee schedules would discourage
physicians from treating Medicare patients, made the reasonable-charge
concept appear to be a sensible standard of payment.138
This payment standard caused serious and persistent problems because
the legislation did not define the reasonable charge.' 39 The statute only
offered a reasonable-charge standard, stating:
(B) [the carrier] will take such action as may be necessary to
assure that, where payment under this part for a service is on a
charge basis, (i) such charge will be reasonable and not higher
than the charge applicable, for a comparable service and under
comparable circumstances, to the policyholders and subscribers
of the carrier ....
. . .In determining the reasonable charge for services for
purposes of this paragraph, there shall be taken into consideration
the customary charges for similar services generally made by the
physician or other person furnishing such services, as well as the
prevailing charges in the locality for similar services.'O

132. See MARMOR, supra note 35, at 80.
133. See id.
134. See id.

135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 80-81.
139. See id. at 85.
140. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1842(b)(3), 79 Stat.
286, 310-11 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3) (1988)).
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This reasonable-charge standard proved completely unworkable in the
beginning because "[n]o one knew what doctors were customarily

charging." 14' Physicians and government officials could not agree on
what constituted the upper limit of a prevailing charge. 4 ' And although

Blue Shield and other commercial insurers had some retrievable data
pertaining to physician fees, the insurance industry could not agree on

what

constituted

"comparable

services"

under

"comparable

circumstances."143
Today, the "reasonable charge" is still a term of art that Congress
continues to include in the statutes, albeit without definition.'" The

reasonable-charge "standard" or "basis" has not been altered since
1965.145 To date, no statutory definition exists for the customary
charge." The "prevailing charge" has been given, if not a statutory
definition, a statutory framework that must be used in determining the
reasonable charge. 47 Yet the reasonable charge is now, indirectly, a
factor of the new Medicare fee schedule.1 " Thus, an understanding of

the development of reasonable-charge criteria is necessary to understand
the impact upon the current program.
From the beginning, Congress left the task of defining the reasonable
charge to the administrators of the Medicare program.1 49 The statute

authorizes HHS to establish "standards and criteria for the efficient and
effective performance of [carrier] contract obligations" that must be
141. MARMOR, supra note 35, at 85.
142. See id. at 85-86.
143. Id. at 86. This uncertainty as to what the reasonable charge was "gave physicians
every incentive to raise their fees." Id.
144. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 13951, 1395u, 1395x (1988).
145. See id. § 1395u(a)(1)(A), (b)(3)(B).
146. See generally id. § 1395x (defining terms relevant to this subchapter).
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(L). This section states:
[n]o charge may be determined to be reasonable... if it exceeds the higher of
(i) the prevailing charge recognized by the carrier and found acceptable to the
[HHS] Secretary for similar services in the same locality... on December 31,
1970, or (ii) the prevailing charge level that, on the basis of statistical data and
methodology acceptable to the Secretary, would cover 75 percent of the
customary charges made for similar services in the same locality during the 12month period ending on the June 30 last preceding the start of the calendar year
in which the service is rendered.
Id.
148. See generally id. § 1395w-4 (Supp. 1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 59,502 (1991) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 405, 413, 415).
149. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1869(a), 79 Stat.
290, 330.
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published in the Federal Register."

In interpreting the statute, the I-IHS

Secretary established criteria recognizing that "[t]he law allows for
flexibility in the determination of reasonable charges to accommodate

reimbursement to the various ways in which health services are furnished
and charged for.""' The criteria for the customary charge,

52

the

prevailing charge,153 and the exceptional charge" command the most
attention.
The customary charge is defined by the H-1S Secretary as "the
uniform amount which the individual physician or other person charges in

the majority of cases for a specific medical procedure or service. " 155
The reasonable charge may never be higher than the customary charge,
except under special and extraordinary circumstances. 56 Thus, if a
carrier has determined a physician's customary charge to be $50 for a
specific service, and the physician increases the charge to $75 for the
particular service, then the customary charge is still $50 and will remain

$50 until a new customary charge is determined and established by the
carrier.

The prevailing

charge is

not specifically

defined by

the

regulations. 5 7 Instead, the statutory instruction is that the prevailing

charge is based on seventy-five percent of the customary charges made for
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(2)(A).
151. 42 C.F.R. § 405.502(a) (1991).
152. See id. § 405.502(a)(1).
153. See id. § 405.502(a)(2).
154. See id.
155. Id. § 405.503(a).
156. Id.
157. See id. § 405.504(a)(2). The regulation states:
[n]o charge for Part B medical or other health services may be considered to be
reasonable if it exceeds the higher of: (i) The prevailing charge for similar
services in the same locality in effect on December 31, 1970, provided such
prevailing charge had been found acceptable by HCFA; or (ii) the prevailing
charge that, on the basis of statistical data and methodology acceptable to HCFA,
would cover: (A) 75 percent of the customary charges made for similar services
in the same locality during the 12-month period of July 1 through June 30
preceding the fee screen year (January 1 through December 31) in which the
service was furnished; or (B) In the case of services furnished more than 12
months before the beginning of the fee screen year (January 1 through December
31) in which the claim or request for payment is submitted, 75 percent of the
customary charges made for similar services in the same locality during the 12
month period of July 1 through June 30 preceding the fee screen year that ends
immediately preceding the fee screen year in which the claim or request for
payment is submitted.
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similar services in the same locality during a twelve-month period. 5 A
locality is usually a political or economic subdivision of a state defining
a specific geographic area." 5 If a locality has four physicians, and each
performs a similar service only once in the specified twelve-month period,
and the four charges are $50, $60, $70 and $80, then the prevailing
charge is $70 because it covers seventy-five percent of the locality's
customary charge. The carrier can establish either a specific prevailing
charge for a service or a range of prevailing charges, based upon the
carrier's accumulated data.16
The exceptional-charge criteria are explicitly defined by both the
statute and the regulations. 16' The criteria allow factors that are found
necessary and appropriate with respect to a specific service to be used in
judging the "inherent reasonable[ness]" of the charge. 62 If the standard
rules for calculating reasonable charges result in "grossly deficient or
excessive charges,"" 6 then HCFA or the carrier may establish special
reasonable-charge limits that may fix either upper or lower limits." 6
Some of the factors taken into account include: (1) whether the
marketplace is competitive or uncompetitive; (2) whether Medicare is the
primary or sole source of payment; (3) whether the technology is new or
changing; (4) whether prevailing charges are inequitable; and (5) whether
increases can be explained by inflation or technology." 6 Essentially,
these criteria allow the carrier a broad response to any actual charge.
The reasonable charge-also called the "approved" or "allowable
charge"-is usually the lower of the customary, prevailing, or actual
charge. 1" If, for example, the range of prevailing charges in a given
locality is between $80 and $100, then: (1) a physician who customarily
charges $80 but who actually charged $75 has a reasonable charge of $75
because the reasonable charge cannot be higher than an actual charge; (2)
a physician who customarily charges $85 and who actually charged $85
has a reasonable charge of $85 because it is the physician's customary
charge and it falls within the prevailing charge range; (3) a physician who
customarily charges $125 and who actually charged $125 has a reasonable
charge of $100 because that is the ceiling of the prevailing charge fee
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id.
Id. § 405.505.
See id. § 405.504(b), (e).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(8) (1988).
42 C.F.R. § 405.502(a)(7) (1991).
Id.
Id.
See id. § 405.502(g)(1).

166. See HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at 20.
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screen; and (4) a physician who customarily charges $80 and who actually
charged $100 has a reasonable charge of $80 because the customary
charge is lower than either the prevailing or actual charge. 167
The reasonable charge is still, by congressional action or inaction,
loosely defined and therefore ambiguous.a This ambiguity, however,
allowed HCFA and the carriers a wide latitude in developing and applying
a reasonable-charge methodology. Moreover, it was the carriers
information system, programmed to accommodate this methodology, that
in effect established the reasonable charge for any particular service in any
particular community."W In most instances, by using these computation
formulas, particularly the seventy-five percent derivation rule, the
prevailing charge usually determined the reasonable charge, because the
prevailing charge was the last to be affected by any increase in fees." 7o
Indeed, many amendments to17 Medicare purposely utilized the prevailing
charge for cost containment. 1
The customary charge no longer reflects true customary levels. The
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984"r (DEFRA) froze the customary- and
prevailing-charge levels for a fifteen-month period, beginning July 1,
1984, at levels no higher than those set beginning July 1, 1983.173
Congress later extended this freeze to March 14, 1986.174 DEFRA also
divided physicians into two groups: those who would contractually agree
to accept the reasonable charge as the full and only charge (participating
physicians), and those who would not (non-participating physicians). 75
Non-participating physicians would not be allowed to charge Medicare
patients in excess of the physicians' actual charge for the same services
during the calendar quarter beginning April 1, 1984. Those who violated
this cap would be prohibited from any participation in the Medicare
program for up to five years and would be subject to civil 0enalties of up
167. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.507 (1991).

168. See

MARMOR,

supra note 35, at 85.

169. "Figuring the doctor's customary charge and the prevailing charge is a mindboggling, if not a computer-boggling, exercise.... Blue Cross [of New York] processes
about 25 million pieces of information in its computers to determine the [reasonable] charge
." Beyond Medicare, supra note 100, at 376.
170. Law & Ensminger, supra note 41, at 12.

171. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3) (1988). Of particular interest is 42 U.S.C. §
1395u(b)(7)(B)(ii)(III) in which the customary charge may be set at no higher than 85% of
the prevailing charge of a similar service.
172. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2306, 98 Stat. 494, 1070-72.
173. Id.
174. See Emergency Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-107, § 5(b), 99 Stat. 479,
amended by Pub. L. No. 99-201, § 2, 99 Stat. 1665.
175. See § 2306, 98 Stat. at 1071-72.
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to $2000 for each violation. 76 Moreover, DEFRA specified that in
determining the customary charges of non-participating physicians for the
twelve-month periods beginning October 1, 1985 and October 1, 1986, the
HHS Secretary would not recognize increases in actual charges when the
freeze was lifted. 1" Participating physicians' increases, on the other
hand, would be factored into the computation of new post-freeze,
customary-charge levels.' 7
This meant that a physician's customary charge was subject to
manipulation based on participation status. Although Medicare carriers had
been accumulating customary charges for twenty-five years, it could be
argued that the current levels, reflecting this manipulation, are not what
physicians would customarily charge in a free marketplace. Instead, the
customary charge is but a historical base that the government, through the
carriers, has used to control fees.' Moreover, because the customary
charge determined the prevailing charge, and the prevailing charge was
usually the lowest charge, the reasonable charge no longer represented an
objective community standard as originally conceived. Rather, it became
a statistic-driven derivative that was prima-facie evidence of itself.
The statutory reasonable charge of the 1960s has been fundamentally
transformed for the 1990s. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989,"8 amended by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990,111
authorized the HHS Secretary to create a national fee schedule for
physician services to be used by carriers when paying Part B claims. s
In essence, this fee schedule will replace the reasonable charge. The final
rules implementing the fee schedule were released on November 25,
1991.183

Since January 1, 1992, Part B claims for physician services are paid
based on the lesser of the actual charge for the service or the fee schedule
amount.184 The statute allows a transition period which generally blends
176. See id. § 2306(j), 98 Stat. at 1072.
177. See id. § 2306(a)(4)(D), 98 Stat. at 1070.
178. Id.
179. It would seem that the only logical response to a reasonable-charge payment
standard based on customary- and prevailing-charge criteria would be government control
of physicians' fees. "Since the payment a doctor receives is determined by the stated
charges at some time in the recent past, doctors have strong eeonomie incentives to keep
stated charges high." Law & Ensminger, supra note 41, at 12.
180. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106.
181. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.
182. 103 Stat. 2106, 2169-70.
183. See 56 Fed. Reg. 59,502 (1991) (to be codified at42 C.F.R. §§ 405, 413, 415).
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a)(l) (Supp. 1990).
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the fee-schedule amount with the reasonable charge-now called the
"adjusted historical payment basis"-at the following ratios: 1:7 in 1992;
1:4 in 1993; 1:3 in 1994; and 1:1 in 1995."s In 1996, the reasonablecharge payment method will be eliminated for all physician services, and
any physician-both participating and non-participating-treating a
Medicare beneficiary will be required to adhere to this fee schedule for all
billing purposes." Although the reasonable-charge standard is still
applicable to most non-physician services, these services account for a
fraction of total Part B claims."n Accordingly, although the reasonable
charge still maintains a statutory posture in the Medicare Act, it seems to
have been relegated to a level of statutory insignificance.
B. Case-Law Analysis of the Reasonable Charge
The validity of the reasonable charge has been examined by the courts
on three related levels. The first is whether a carrier's determination of a
reasonable charge conforms with Medicare regulations and statutes." 8
The second is whether the regulations promulgated by HHS are valid." 9
The third is whether Congress has the authority to create a reasonablecharge payment standard for Part B reimbursements." g Although case
law is still developing in this area, a validity test has been discerned and
applied by the Supreme Court.1 9'
1. The Jurisdictional Obstacle
Case-law development in this area has been consistently hampered by
the "thorny question"" 9 of jurisdiction. Although the 1986 amendments
to the Social Security Act made this issue moot for disputes after January
185. See § 1395w-4(a)(2)(a), (b) (Supp. 1990).
186. See § 1395w-4(g).
187. See Levit et al., supra note 102, at 39.
188. See Michigan Academy of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 728
F.2d 326 (6th Cir.) [Michigan Academy 1], cert. granted and vacated sub nom. Heckler v.
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 469 U.S. 807 [Michigan Academy II], remanded
sub nom. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Michigan, 751 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1984) [Michigan Academy III], order rescinded, 757
F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1985) [Michigan Academy IV], aff'd sub nom. Bowen v. Michigan
Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) [Michigan Academy V1.
189. See Michigan Academy 1, 728 F.2d at 331-32.
190. See Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580, 591 (Ct. Cl. 1980), modified,
647 F.2d 129 (Ct. Cl. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 201 (1982).
191. See Michigan Academy V, 476 U.S. at 669.
192. Michigan Academy 1, 728 F.2d at 329.
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1, 1987,11 it was the threshold issue in most earlier cases. Moreover,

it still is an issue for any pre-1987 claims on appeal. 19

The significance of the jurisdictional obstacle is that the question of
the validity of the reasonable charge is not addressed. The courts, lacking
jurisdiction, did not reach the merits of the cases.195 Dicta from these
cases in which the courts held that jurisdiction was lacking, however,

along with the holdings of the lower courts in which jurisdiction had been
found, provide an ample basis for this analysis."
Prior to 1982, federal courts invoked jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act, 1" the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,198 or under federal

question jurisdiction. 19 In United States v. Erika, Inc., the Supreme

Court unanimously reversed a decision by the United States Court of

Claims that had invoked jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.'

°

The lower

court relied on the language of the Act, which "permits the Court of

Claims to hear 'any claim against the United States founded either upon
the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an
executive department.'"'" The Supreme Court "granted certiorari to
determine whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over suits of this

kind."I The Court, examining the language and the legislative history
of § 1395ff(a),m stated that "[i]n the context of the statute's precisely
drawn provisions, this omission [of Part B claim review] provides
193. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9341(b),
100 Stat. 2037, 2038.
194. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the
district court had no jurisdiction to review a hearing officer's ruling on an amount
determination).
195. See, e.g., Michigan Academy 1, 728 F.2d at 332 n.5.
196. See infra notes 197-227 and accompanying text.
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988); see, e.g., Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580,
586 (Ct. Cl. 1980), inodified, 647 F.2d 129 (Ct. Cl. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 456
U.S. 201 (1982).
198. Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, § 1361, 76 Stat. 744
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988)); see, e.g., Alexander v. Schweicker,
516 F. Supp. 182, 186 (D. Conn. 1981).
199. Pub. L. No. 87-748, § 1361, 76 Stat. 744 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1988)); see, e.g., Ringer v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd
sub nom. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984).
200. 456 U.S. 201, 205 (1982).
201. Id. at 205 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988)).
202. Id. at 206.
203. See supra notes 1, 12-13 and accompanying text.
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persuasive evidence that Congress deliberately intended to foreclose
further review of such claims."
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Heckler v. Ringer,25
in which the plaintiffs challenged both Part A and Part B amount
determinations. The lower court found jurisdiction under both the federal
question and mandamus statutes.' Regarding the Part A challenge, the
Supreme Court held that a challenge to an entitlement of a Part A benefit
for a surgical procedure, which the HHS Secretary had declared was no
longer covered, had to exhaust administrative remedies before any federal
court could accept jurisdiction. m7 The only exceptions were if the HHS
Secretary had waived the exhaustion requirements, having deemed such
requirements futile or if the claim was "wholly collateral" to the claim for
benefits." s The Court, however, did not even consider the Part B
challenges because judicial review was precluded under Erika.' The
Court found that Part B claims that challenged procedures were
"inextricably intertwined" with claims for benefits and were not judicially
reviewable even when the procedural elements of the claim were separated
from the substantive elements.21 ° Thus, Ringer further insulated the
reasonable charge from any judicial scrutiny.
As in Erika, the Supreme Court, in Bowen v. Michigan Academy of
Family Physicians,211 addressed only the jurisdictional issue and not the
validity of the reasonable charge.212 This was because the HHS
Secretary, as the petitioner, did not seek a "review of the decision on the
merits."2" 3 Instead, the Secretary renewed an assertion, rejected by both
lower courts,214 that "Congress [had] forbidden judicial review of all
204. Erika, 456 U.S. at 208.
205. 466 U.S. 602 (1984).
206. See Ringer v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984).
207. See Ringer, 466 U.S. at 617-19.
208. Id. at 618 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330 (1976)).
209. See id. at 608-09 n.4.
210. Id. at 614.
211. 476 U.S. 667 (1986).
212. See id. at 669.
213. Id.
214. See Michigan Academy of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 502
F. Supp. 751, 752 (E.D. Mich. 1980), remanded, 728 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), cert. granted
and vacated sub nom. Heckler v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 469 U.S. 807,
remanded sub noma. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Michigan, 751 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1984), order rescinded, 757 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.
1985), aff'd sub nom. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667
(1986).
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questions affecting the amount of benefits payable under Part B of the
Medicare program. "21 One year earlier, the Court had denied certiorari
in Starnes v. Schweiker,2 16 in which the plaintiff had challenged a rule
capping reimbursements for computerized tomography scans.217 In
deciding Starnes, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court had
jurisdiction under either federal question or the mandamus statute.2 8
The court, however, held that "Ringer decides that Starnes [sic] contention
that there were procedural irregularities in the promulgation of the caps
are so inextricably intertwined with a claim for benefits that any judicial
review is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff."21 9 Thus, it could be reasoned
that the Secretary fully expected the Court, relying on Erika, Ringer, and
Starnes, to reverse the Sixth Circuit's decision in Michigan Academy. The
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Michigan Academy specifically
because the circuit courts were divided.'
The Court, in Michigan Academy, held that regulations creating a
payment methodology are not insulated from judicial review. Relying
on the language of Marbury v. Madison' that "the very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws,"'2 the Michigan Academy Court effectively
overruled Ringer. The Court distinguished between a claim-challenging
procedure and a claim for benefits.' More importantly, by creating two
distinct challenges to a' reasonable-charge determination, Michigan
Academy was distinguished from Erika.'
Arguably, Michigan Academy made no substantial ruling regarding the
issue of the reasonable charge because only the jurisdictional question, and
not the merit of the case, was at issue. By affirming the lower court's
decision, however, the Supreme Court distinguished between "challenges
mounted against the method by which such amounts are to be determined
215. 476 U.S. at 669.
216. 748 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985).
217. See id. at 217-18. A tomography scan is an X-ray of a selected plane in the body.
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1276 (2d ed. 1982).
218. See 748 F.2d at 218.
219. Id.
220. Michigan Academy V, 476 U.S. at 669.
221. See id. at 678-81.
222. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
223. MichiganAcademy V, 476 U.S. at 670 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
163 (1803)).
224. See id. at 677-82.
225. See id. at 675-78 (describing challenges to the Secretary's regulations, as well
as the method by which awards are computed).
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[and] the determinations themselves."' The Court further clarified
the distinction as "the method by which Part B awards are computed as
opposed to the computation." ' 7 Therefore, Michigan Academy
established a dichotomy that all future Part B challenges would be tested
against to resolve these jurisdictional questions. Concomitantly, this
dichotomy would also test reasonable-charge validity.
...

2. The Method/Amount Dichotomy
The distinction between a method challenge and an amountdetermination challenge can be gleaned from the facts of both Erika and
Michigan Academy. Moreover, the analyses presented by the lower courts
evince the difference.' At the same time, however, these differences
may be only semantic because the dichotomy is in flux.'
Erika, Inc. was a major distributor of kidney-dialysis equipment and
supplies, selling to both individuals and institutions.'
Some of its
customers were Medicare beneficiaries who assigned the payment of
benefits directly to Erika, as provided for by statute."9 ' This gave the
company standing to challenge any reasonable-charge determinations.2 32
Prudential Insurance Company, the Medicare carrier, used Erika's charges
to determine both the customary and the prevailing charges of Erika's
products because Erika's sales represented almost all the sales of the
relevant materials in the locality'33 Prudential's source for these charges
was a price list located in Erika's annual catalog, effective July 1 of each
year.' Prudential determined the reasonable charge at the beginning of
its fiscal year, which was also July 1. Instead of basing the reasonable
charge on Erika's current calendar year's billing, Prudential used the price
226. Id. at 675 (emphasis added).

227. Id. at 676.
228. See, e.g., American Ambulance Serv. v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 901, 904-05 (3d Cir.
1990) (holding that an ambulance service's challenges to the method by which Part B
reimbursement decisions were made were within the jurisdiction of the court); Texas
Medical Ass'n v. Sullivan, 875 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the court had
no jurisdiction to review claims of physicians and beneficiaries that carriers misapplied the
computation method).
229. See infra notes 230-290 and accompanying text.
230. Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580, 583 (Ct. Cl. 1980), modified, 647
F.2d 129 (Ct. Cl. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 201 (1982).
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(B)(ii) (1988).
232. See Erika, 634 F.2d at 586-87.
233. Id. at 583-84.
234. Id. at 584.
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list in Erika's previous year's catalog.' As a result, the reasonable
charge reflected pricing some twelve- to twenty-four-months old.'
Exacerbating the issue was the shortage of a meat product needed to
make the anti-clotting drug, heparin, used in kidney dialysis.7 Erika
raised its price on the drug several times, reflecting the substantial cost
increases associated with the shortage." Although a supplemental price
list was sent to Prudential, the carrier did not change the reasonablecharge determination immediately. 9 When Prudential finally changed
the determination, it did not apply the new reasonable charge
retroactively.' ° After a fair-hearing review, in which the reasonablecharge determinations were upheld, Erika brought an action in federal
court.24
The United States Court of Claims held that Prudential violated both
the statute and the regulations because the prevailing charge determinations
were based not on the "preceding calendar year" but on a' single day-July
1.' The court held that "[tihe selection of the appropriate method of
calculation [was] for Prudential to determine . . . . [T]he carrier has
considerable discretion to adopt whatever method of calculation it
concludes would most accurately measure and reflect Erika's customary
charges during the preceding calendar year."' 3 But this did not include
disregarding "changes in Erika's prices during the preceding calendar
year."' By ignoring both the statutory and regulatory directives, the
carrier's determination was held invalid.'
Although the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision
solely on jurisdictional grounds, without discussing the reasonable-charge
issue,' the Court's recitation of the facts of the case appears to
disagree with the lower court's analysis. The Court stated that "Prudential
interpreted the relevant statute and regulations to define the 'reasonable
charges' for respondent's product to be their [sic] catalog price as of July
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 584, 588-89.
See id.
See id. at 584.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 584, 589.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 589.
Id.
See id.
See United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 206 (1982).
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1 of the preceding calendar year." 7 The footnote to this statement
emphasizes the word "preceding" two more times, possibly inferring that
the prevailing charge was to be based on the price list of the preceding
July 1 and not the current July 1.1 This repeated emphasis could be
interpreted to mean that the carrier had applied the regulation correctly
and that the Court may have reversed on the merits as well.
The dispute in Michigan Academy focused on a regulation
promulgated by the HIIHS Secretary that "permit[ted] carriers to establish
separate prevailing charges for 'specialists' and 'nonspecialists' and
specifically provide[d] that carriers can develop more than one set of
prevailing charges based on fee patterns in a local area." 9 The
Medicare carrier, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, in interpreting
this regulation, created three distinct groups of physicians: (1) hospital
personnel and other interns; (2) board-certified or board-eligible
specialists; and (3) general practitioners, family physicians, and other nonphysicians such as chiropractors and podiatrists.'
Thus, "patients
receiving one type of service from a specialist [were] entitled to incur a
higher reasonable charge, and therefore to receive a larger reimbursement
than if they received the identical service from a non-specialist. " "
Michigan Academy, a nonprofit corporation representing family
physicians, challenged the regulation on the grounds that it violated the
Medicare statute, had an "impermissible impact" on a patient's choice of
physician, "unduly infringed the free practice of medicine, " and violated
247. Id. at 204 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3) (1976 ed. & Supp.
IV)).
248. See id. at 204 n.2. The complete footnote reads:
Claimants' reimbursable "reasonable charge" cannot exceed the "prevailing
charge" calculated for "the locality." 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3) (1976 ed. and
Supp. IV). In an effort to control the extent to which the Medicare program
contributes to the inflation of medical costs, the "prevailing charge" formula is
based on typical local rates for the preceding year. See 42 CFR §
405.504(a)(2)(i) (1980) (defining "prevailing charge" as the fee that "would
cover 75 percent of the customary charges made for similar services in the same
locality during the calendar year preceding the start of the 12-month period
(beginning July 1 of each year) in which the claim is submitted or the request for
payment is made") (emphasis added). Prudential defined respondent's own
catalog price as the relevant "prevailing charge" because respondent was
virtually the only provider of dialysis supplies within Prudential's locality.
Id.
249. Michigan Academy 1, 728 F.2d 326, 327 (6th Cir.) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 405.504
(1967)).
250. Id. at 328.
251. Id.
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the Fifth Amendment by denying due process and equal protection."5 2
The Sixth Circuit found that the "similar services" clause of 42 U.S.C. §
Recognizing that deferential
1395u(b)(3) had been violated. "
consideration must be granted to regulations promulgated by the HHS
Secretary and emphasizing that caution must be exercised when
overturning such regulations, the Sixth Circuit held that the regulation was
invalid and ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
Having found the regulation "statutorily unsound," 5 the Sixth
Circuit did not address the constitutional issues. Based on public-policy
considerations, however, the court also held that the regulation was
"irrational."'
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the "district court's
findings concerning the pernicious impact of this system on the cost of
medical care."" The system induced physicians to become specialists
and forced patients to seek specialists, even for routine health care. 8
The court concluded that this regulation infringed upon a patient's free
choice of physicians 59
Erika and Michigan Academy presented two distinct fact patterns. In
Michigan Academy, the "similar services" clause of the statute was
violated,'W while the violation in Erika concerned a carrier's
interpretation and application of a regulation.6 1 Arguably, in order to
invalidate a reasonable-charge determination, the statute, not the
regulation, must be violated. 2
Michigan Academy, by creating the method/amount dichotomy,
opened the doors to the federal courts that Erika and Ringer had
previously closed. Subsequently, based on the MichiganAcademy holding,
some circuit courts reversed district court dismissals.' One case of
252. Id.
253. See id. at 331-32 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3) (1988)).
254. See id. at 332.
255. Id. at 332 n.5.
256. Id. at 332.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 333.
260. Id. at 331-32.
261. See United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 204-06 (1982).
262. See Michigan Academy 1, 728 F.2d at 330-31.
263. See, e.g., Karnak Educ. Trust v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 1517 (1lth Cir. 1987)
(reversing the district court's dismissal based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but
affrming the court's dismissal for failure to state a cause of action); Medical Fund-Phila.
Geriatric Ctr. v. Heckler, 804 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1986) (reversing the district court's
dismissal based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and allowing plaintiffs to amend the
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particular concern is Linoz v. Heckler." In Linoz, the Ninth Circuit

held that a rule created by the HHS Secretary denying Part B coverage for
certain ambulance services was invalid because the rule was not authorized

by statute and did not conform with the notice and comment procedures
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).a Although this was a total
denial of a benefit and not an amount determination, this case is notable
because the Court of Appeals found jurisdiction by applying Michigan

Academy, thus foreclosing the defendant's assertion that the "inextricably
intertwined" rule of Ringer barred review.'

Moreover, the court found

the rule invalid because the rule was characterized as substantive and not

interpretive. 7
By applying the holding of Linoz to a reasonable-charge dispute, a
substantive rule by the HHS Secretary would fall under the Michigan

Academy side of the dichotomy.'

Therefore, it would be a "method of

computation" dispute. Thus, a reasonable charge determined by the

application of such a rule, not promulgated pursuant to the Medicare
statutes nor conforming to the APA requirements, would most likely be
found invalid.'Other cases appeared on the federal dockets asserting challenges to
methodology. These cases, however, were held to be amountdetermination disputes dressed up as method disputes to take advantage of

the Michigan Academy rule.2' Two of these cases, because of their

complaint to allege federal-question jurisdiction); Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.
1986) (reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment based on lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction).
264. 800 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1986).
265. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1988)); see Linoz, 800 F.2d at 877-78. The rule, promulgated by the HHS Secretary, was
included in a manual for carriers and was not published in the Federal Register, thus
violating the APA. See id. at 878 n. 11.
266. Linoz, 800 F.2d at 875-76.
267. See id. at 877-78 n. 10.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 878.
270. See Kuritzky v. Blue Shield, 850 F.2d 126, 128 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a
plaintiff's assertion of "method" does not mean carrier's method of applying the regulation
but method set forth in the Secretary's regulatory scheme), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006
(1989); American Ambulance Serv. v. Sullivan, 716 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding
no subject-matter jurisdiction because plaintiff's challenge did not specifically challenge any
statutory provision or any rule, regulation, or policy promulgated by the Secretary), rev'd,
911 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Ruegsegger, 702 F. Supp. 438, 447
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a "disgruntled Medicare claimant cannot avoid the
proscription of Erika by simply recasting a challenge to an [amount] determination as an
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fact patterns and the dollar amounts in dispute, merit further
examination.
In 1988, the Sixth Circuit once again was presented with a challenge
to a reasonable-charge determination in Association of Seat Lift
Manufacturers v. Bowen." The court affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of this pre-1987 claim dispute by applying the Erika ruling.'m
It applied Erika instead of Michigan Academy because here, "as in Erika,
only [the] implementation of a method [and] not the method itself, was at
issue."'
At issue were the reasonable-charge determinations of'seat-lift chairs,
used by persons who cannot rise or have difficulty rising from a sitting
position.'" Finding the prevailing charge for this item excessive, the
carrier exercised its discretionary responsibility by using other data to
establish a reasonable charge based on the "inherent reasonableness"
provision of the exceptional-charge criteria. 75 The carrier, "[h]aving
considered the entire formidable compendium of statistical and
comparative information collected during its comprehensive survey,"276
agreed with an HCFA letter citing a Sears seat-lift chair as an "'example'
of available sources ....
2'
Accordingly, the carrier determined the reasonable charge based on
the cost of the Sears model listed in the 1985-1986 Sears Home Health
Care "Specialog."278 The plaintiff, representing medical-equipment
suppliers, asserted that HCFA instructed the carrier to determine the
reasonable charge based on the Sears model. The plaintiff characterized
attack on methodology"); see also Texas Medical Ass'n v. Sullivan, 875 F.2d 1160, 1165
(5th Cir.) (holding that the semantics of the amount/methodology distinction must be
transcended to review Part B claim disputes), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1011 (1989);
Association of Seat Lift Mfrs. v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 308, 317 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that
the plaintiff's characterization of the carrier's application of method is an amount
determination and not a methodology dispute), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989); cf.
Anderson v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff's
characterization of the complaint "artfully tracks the mandate of [Michigan Academy]").
271. 858 F.2d 308, 308 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989)
[hereinafter Seat Lift].
272. See id. at 316-17.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 309-10.
275. Id. at310-11.
276. Id. at 313-14.
277. Id. at 313.
278. See id. at 314.
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this as a methodology subject to review under Michigan Academy.279
The Sixth Circuit, however, ruled:
challenges to statutes, regulations, and instructions prescribing
Part B payment criteria, rather than challenges to the application
of such criteria . . . were the only type of challenge that could
not be adjudicated in a Carrier fair hearing. Because the instant
plaintiffs essentially disputed only [the carrier's] application of the
"inherent reasonableness" criterion in determining the reasonable
charge... rather than the validity of the criterion itself, their socalled "method" challenge is actually a challenge to an amount
determination ....
This court narrowed, or at least refined, the Michigan Academy
holding by requiring a direct and clear challenge to the validity of the
statutes, the regulations, or the instructions." 1 Because the plaintiffs in
Seat Lift did not specifically challenge the validity of the exceptionalcharge criterion, their complaint was characterized as an amount dispute,
which could only be reviewed in a fair hearing and not in federal
court.'
A 1989 decision of the Fifth Circuit may further affect the distinctions
of this dichotomy. In Texas Medical Ass'n v. Sullivan,' the carrier,
while converting customary- and prevailing-charge data to a new
information system, was unable to retrieve the reasonable-charge data for
eighteen medical procedures.'
In response to physician complaints
about underpayment for these eighteen procedures, the carrier set the
reasonable charge at the highest prevailing rate. ' HCFA became aware
of this situation, corrected the data, and found that the program
overpayment totaled $13.3 million, paid to 5125 physicians and nearly
15,000 beneficiaries. 6 HCFA then directed the carrier to institute
recoupment efforts. 8 7
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See id. at 315.
Id. at 316.
See id.
See id. at 317.
875 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1989).
See id. at 1161-62.
See id. at 1162.
See id. at 1162-63.
See id. at 1163.
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The plaintiffs sued to enjoin the carrier from implementing the
recovery plan, and the district court granted the injunction. 8 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that there was no subject-matter jurisdiction
because these were pre-1987 claims and the dispute involved a
misapplication of the method of computation.289 The Fifth Circuit was
critical of the district court's finding of an improper payment
methodology, stating:
[the district court] failed to transcend the semantics of the
amount/methodology distinction. It is crucial to go beyond
semantics because all challenges to Part B benefit determinations
can be recast as reviewable challenges to methodology since all
awards of Part B benefits or payments are based on a method of
calculation. To separate the grist from the chaff and method from
amount, we must determine whether the challenge is to the
validity of a rule, regulation, or instruction of the Secretary or
merely a claim that [the carrier] "misapplied or misinterpreted
valid rules and regulations." The amount/methodology distinction
really boils down to a "distinction between the rules, regulations
and statutes setting forth the proper computation method and the
carrier's applications of those provisions in determining the
benefits owed."'
As in Seat Lift, this court attempted to create a standard to test
reasonable-charge challenges. In doing so, however, the "inextricably
intertwined" concept of substance and procedure may have been
resurrected. Although any amount determinations may be recast as method
disputes, any legitimate method dispute that involves a benefit claim may
fail the Texas Medical test because it can also be characterized as an
amount dispute. Unless the challenge is so clearly removed from the
benefit claim, all reasonable-charge disputes may be characterized as only
carrier misapplication of the regulations and statutes.
3. Government Authority
Congress has the authority to create and perpetuate a payment
standard based upon a reasonable-charge concept. The "legislation
conferring monetary benefits is granted a 'strong presumption of
288. See Texas Medical Ass'n v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 643, 644 (,V.D. Tex. 1988),
rev'd sub noin. Texas Medical Ass'n v. Sullivan, 875 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1989).
289. See 875 F.2d at 1164-65.
290. Id. at 1165-66 (quoting Kuritzky v. Blue Shield, Inc., 850 F.2d 126, 128 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989)).
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constitutionality,' . . . because 'Congress should have discretion in
deciding how to expend necessarily limited resources.'"" Furthermore,
no case directly challenges this authority. Such silence may be regarded
as a concession. 292
Moreover, because of Whitney v. Heckler, it is unlikely that any direct
challenge asserted today would survive.'
In Whitney, plaintiffs
challenged Congress's authority to freeze the customary and prevailing
charge and to regulate the reasonable charge.' It is important to note
that the plaintiffs "concede[d] that Congress has the power to regulate
medical services and charges ... but nevertheless insist[ed] that in doing
so, Congress must provide an administrative mechanism to ensure that all
doctors are guaranteed a 'reasonable' profit." 5 The Eleventh Circuit
held that DEFRA did not deny physicians due process, and that freezing
the customary and prevailing charge was neither a taking under the Fifth
Amendment nor could be construed as a bill of attainder. 2' The court
stated that the fee ceiling imposed by the legislation, which was "to reduce
the federal deficit without placing the burden of such reduction solely on
Medicare beneficiaries,"2' was permissible because it was not
arbitrary.29 Moreover, the penalties imposed by DEFRA were
constitutional because they were intended to further non-punitive
goals. 9 With the Supreme Court denying certiorari," Congress's

authority to limit increases in the customary and prevailing charge, even
on a temporary basis, in turn, strengthened Congress's authority to control
physician fees.
In Metrolina Family Practice Group, P.A. v. Sullivan,"' a district

court held that the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution does not prevent
291. Alexander v. Schweicker, 516 F. Supp. 182, 189 (D. Conn. 1981) (quoting
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,238 (1981) and Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181,
185 (1976)). (Inconsistent spelling of litigant's name reflects lower court's mistake. The
correct spelling is Schweiker.).
292. See Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 968-69 (1Ith Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom.
Whitney v. Bowen, 479 U.S. 813 (1986).
293. Id.
294. See id. at 967.
295. Id. at 968-69.
296. See id. at 971-73.
297. Id. at 970.
298. See id.
299. See id. at 974.
300. See 479 U.S. 813 (1986).
301. 767 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D.N.C. 1989).
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the government from controlling physician fees.' The court reasoned
that because Medicare regulations "directly controlling a small area of
medical practice"' constituted a valid exercise of Congress's power
under the Spending Clause of the Constitution,'
"the Tenth
Amendment will not act as a bar to legislation that is 'plainly national in
area and dimensions.'" '
In addition, the court rejected plaintiff's
arguments that the regulations created an unconstitutional taking under the
Fifth Amendment' because "[i]t is well established that government
price regulation does not constitute a taking of property where the
regulated group
is not required to participate in the regulated
7
industry."30
Primarily, the courts have examined the validity of the reasonable
charge at the regulatory level. In Alexander v. Schweicker,"8 plaintiffs
directly challenged the method adopted by the Secretary for computing the
annual Part B deductible.' They specifically "object[ed] to the . . .
policy and practice of applying the officially-approved 'reasonable charge'
for physicians' services" instead of the actual charge.' Having found
mandamus jurisdiction under the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 31I
the district court held that the "construction of the statutory language
[relating to the reasonable charge] is consistent with the Congressional
intent reflected in the Medicare Act" 312 of imposing uniform
13
reimbursements in order to discourage physicians from overcharging.
Therefore, a challenge to the reasonable charge will succeed only if the
302. Id. at 1320.
303. Id. at 1321.
304. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have Power To... provide for the
...general Welfare.").
305. 767 F. Supp. at 1321 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1936)).
306. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be. .. deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.").
307. 767 F. Supp. at 1322 (quoting Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 972 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied sub non. Whitney v. Bowen, 479 U.S. 813 (1986)).
308. 516 F. Supp. 182 (D. Conn. 1981).
309. Id. at 183.
310. Id.
311. Pub. L. No. 87-748 § 1361, 76 Stat. 744.
312. Alexander, 516 F. Supp. at 187.
313. Id. at 188. The court stated: "[i]f physicians knew that their patients were more
likely to receive Medicare Part B benefits if they were to charge those patients at high
rates, the physicians would not be under the same pressure to conform their charges to
prevailing rates as the existing Medicare Part B system requires." Id.
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methodology of calculating the reasonable charge is found inconsistent
with the program's purpose.
The customary-, prevailing-, and exceptional-charge criteria would
most likely be found consistent with congressional intent. The
permissibility of the regulatory criteria may be evidenced by the dictum
in Seat Lift.314 The court appears to affirm the validity of the
exceptional-charge criterion because the carrier "is given wide
discretionary judgment to consider inherent reasonableness criteria under
those circumstances where use of customary and prevailing charge data
alone would result in unreasonable costs."315 The court's holding is
based, however, on a challenge to the application of the method,316 and
the criteria may still be subject to examination. On the other hand, the
court's dictum, if taken to its logical conclusion, might permit a carrier,
deciding that customaryr and prevailing-charge data yield an unacceptable
result, to use an alternate method of broad scope.
4. The Fair-Hearing Requirement
In Michigan Academy, 1 8 the Supreme Court stated:
[a]s the Secretary has made clear, "the legality, constitutional or
otherwise, of any provision of the Act or regulations relevant to
the Medicare Program" is not considered in a fair hearing held by
a carrier to resolve a grievance related to a determination of the
amount of a Part B award.3 19
Nevertheless, two years later, in Seat Lift, the Sixth Circuit stated that "it
is important to note that a Carrier fair hearing was available to adjudicate
the validity of appellant's claims" 3' and then recited the particulars of
the procedure approvingly.3 2' The court then stated that "the existence
of a hearing in the instant case significantly undercuts any argument for
federal court jurisdiction. ''3 Although never stated, it can be inferred
314.
(1989).
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Seat Lift, 858 F.2d 308, 310 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078
Id.
Id.
See generally id. at 310-16.
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986).
Id. at 675-76 (quoting Medicare Carrier's Manual § 12016 (1985)).
Seat Lift, 858 F.2d at 316.
See id. at 317.
Id.
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that the disputed amounts were in the millions of dollars.' Thus, even
multi-million-dollar disputes must fulfill the fair-hearing requirement.
Moreover, the application of the court's logic might mean that the
existence of the fair-hearing procedure justifies the requirement, even in
post-1987 cases.
The Texas Medical court likewise concluded that the fair hearing was
the only review available, even when the amount in dispute was more than
$13 million. 3 ' Furthermore, the court stated that because these
challenges are matters for a fair hearing, the plaintiffs have "failed on the
additional and now superfluous ground of failure to exhaust the
administrative remedies before seeking relief from a federal district
court." 3' This court may have imposed a fair-hearing requirement even
if jurisdiction had been granted. While dismissing the case, the court
emphasized the "bald faith we are placing . . . in the Secretary, HCFA
and [the carrier] to prescribe a workable system that will ... not impede
the fundamental fairness due to all physicians and beneficiaries entitled to
such review. " 2'3 Texas Medical may have created a fair-hearing
requirement for all reasonable-charge disputes, subject to a test of
fundamental fairness.327
Isaacs v. Bowen,' however, may become the leading post-1987
case. Paradoxically, it returns almost full circle to Erika because it
forestalls-though
not forecloses-judicial
review of amount
determinations.'2 The plaintiffs, dissatisfied Part B claimants who
disputed charges in excess of $500, were denied direct access to an AIJ
because they had not first had a fair hearing. 3' The district court
initially found for the plaintiffs, based on the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986.31 But on a motion for reargument, the court
reversed, holding that, based on the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
323. The court noted that more than 11,500 seat-lift chairs were sold to Medicare
beneficiaries between April 1984 and March 1985. See id. at 313 n.5. The range of
prevailing charges for this item was from $1150 to $2262. Id. at 311. The carrier
determined a reasonable-charge of $869.51. Id. at 314. Even a $300 dispute would total
almost $3.5 million for that year.
324. Texas Medical Ass'n v. Sullivan, 875 F.2d 1160, 1170 (5th Cir. 1989).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1170-71.
327. See id. at 1160.
328. 865 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1989).
329. See id. at 478.
330. See Isaacs v. Bowen, 683 F. Supp. 930, 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d
468 (2d Cir. 1989).
331. Pub. L. No. 99-509 § 9341, 100 Stat. 2037-38; see Isaacs, 683 F. Supp. at 934.
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1987,332 it was Congress's intent to make appeals to an ALJ contingent
on a 333preliminary fair hearing for amounts in dispute more than
$100.

The Second Circuit affirmed the decision. 3' Addressing a dueprocess challenge, the court cited Schweiker v. McClure33 5 as upholding
the constitutionality of the mandatory fair hearing. 3" The court found
that even though there would be a nineteen-month delay between claim
initiation and ALT review,337 "[r]egrettably, delay is a natural
concomitant of our administrative bureaucracy.""33 Moreover, the court
stated several times that Medicare benefits are not based on financial need,
so the risk of government-created poverty is minimal. 339 Also, the court
noted that most Part B claim disputes are brought not by the beneficiaries,
but by the physicians.' Finally, echoing Erika, the court stated that
"Part B covers supplementary medical services, not those primary services
covered by Part A. "341
Unanswered by this case is whether a method challenge likewise
requires a fair hearing. Arguably, such a requirement exists simply
because of the difficulty in distinguishing the dichotomy. The courts,
having recognized that any amount determination may be recast as a
method challenge, 2 could invoke the corollary that all method disputes
may appear as amount disputes because a claim is usually involved.
Because method disputes may be recast as amount disputes and amount
disputes recharacterized as method disputes, it would be logical to assume
that the courts would require a fair hearing for all disputes. In doing so,
the Texas Medical semantics may not need to be transcended.
Furthermore, by using the fair hearing and AUJ review as a filtering
process, the courts might be able to alleviate docket congestion.
332. Pub. L. No. 100-203 § 4082, 101 Stat. 1330-128; see Isaacs, 683 F. Supp. at

934-35.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See Isaacs, 683 F. Supp. at 932-35.
See Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468, 475 (2d Cir. 1989).
456 U.S. 188 (1982).
865 F.2d at 475 (citing Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982)).
See id.
Id. at 477.
See id. at 476.
See id. The court offered no support. Doctors, however, are more likely to bring

a lawsuit than an elderly ill person.
341. Id.
342. Texas Medical Ass'n v. Sullivan, 875 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1989).
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5. Afterview
Although the cases never presented a direct challenge to the validity

of Congress's authority to create the reasonable charge,

3

there is no

doubt that Congress has this right. All cases involving Medicare issues
begin with a recitation of the Medicare program and cite the statutes
applicable to Part B amount disputes.
It cannot be disputed that

Medicare is a lawful creation of Congress. Accordingly, Congress has the

power to authorize the HHS Secretary to promulgate a methodology to be

used to determine the reasonable charge.Y A reasonable charge may be
challenged if the Secretary's regulations do not comport with the Medicare
statutes or if they violate a provision of the Administrative Procedure
Act. 4 7 Similarly, a carrier's application of the method may, since 1987,

be challenged in a federal court.' The carrier, however, has been given
wide discretion by Congress, the Secretary, and the courts.4 9
Furthermore, the imposition of a fair hearing in all claim disputes, though
still uncertain, would appear to place the burden of proving a charge's

unreasonableness
on the claimant if the carrier is presumed to be
3°

correct. The fair-hearing requirement, along with all other challenges to a
Medicare Part B amount determination, will most likely be rendered moot
as the system shifts from the reasonable-charge payment method to the
fee-schedule payment method. This is because Congress has expressly

precluded both judicial and administrative review of: (1) any determination
of the adjusted historical payment basis (i.e., the reasonable charge); (2)
343. See, e.g., Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 669
(1986) (recognizing that "[blecause it ruled in favor of respondents on statutory grounds,
the District Court did not reach their constitutional claims," thereby avoiding any direct
challenge to Congress's authority); United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 206 n.5
(1982) (noting that respondent declined to raise any constitutional claim).
344. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468, 469-70 (2d Cir. 1989); Whitney v.
Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 965-67 (1lth Cir. 1986).
345. See, e.g., Whitney, 780 F.2d at 965-66.
346. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(B) (1988).
347. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988); see Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir.
1986); Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 352, 355-56 (9th Cir. 1982).
348. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c) (1988).
349. See, e.g., Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580, 589 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (noting
that "[t]he carrier has considerable discretion to adopt whatever method of calculation it
concludes would most accurately measure and reflect Erika's customary charges during the
preceding calendar year.") clarifiedin response to defendant's motion for reh 'g, 647 F.2d
129 (Ct. Cl. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 201 (1982).
350. See supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text.
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any determination of the components of a fee-schedule amount; and (3) the
establishment of the system for coding physician services. 351 Thus, an
amount challenge to a future Part B claim brought in either an
administrative or a judicial forum should be denied. If, however, the
challenge is framed as a method dispute rather than an amount dispute,
Marbury v. Madison352 and Bowen v. Michigan Academ)P 53 might open
the forum's door. Of course, whether the challenge would prevail on the
merits of the case is a question that can only be answered based on the
particular facts and circumstances of the case.
IV. LIMITING PHYSICIAN CHARGES

A. FederalAction
An important issue relating to the development of the Medicare
program was not only what the physician-payment method would be, but
also who would pay the physician fees. 3" The existing Blue Shield plans
paid the physicians directly, while the commercial insurers usually
reimbursed the patient.35 The early Blue Shield plans required the
physician to accept the Blue Shield payments as full compensation for
services rendered, but competitive pressures from the commercial insurers
required Blue Shield to keep their premiums low.3" Thus, to maintain
physician participation in the program, most Blue Shield plans found it
necessary to permit physicians to charge patients amounts in excess of the
Blue Shield payment rather than limiting their fees.35 This practice of
the insurer pays is called "balance
charging35 the
8 patient more than what
billing."
Balance billing represented the best of both worlds to the provider of
service. It allowed a physician treating a Blue Shield patient to have the
security of knowing that Blue Shield would pay at least the fee-schedule
351. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 w-4(i)(1)(A), (i)(1)(B), (i)(1)(E) (1988).
352. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
353. 476 U.S. 669 (1986).
354. MARMOR, supra note 35, at 85.
355. Law & Ensminger, supra note 41, at 15-16.
356. Id. at 16.
357. Id.
358. Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790, 790 (1st Cir. 1987). The
common usage of the term "balance billing" refers to when a patient is liable for the
difference between the bill and the benefit determination of the insurer. See id. For
example, if a Blue Shield patient incurs a bill of $2000 for physician services in a hospital,
and based upon a fee schedule, Blue Shield pays the doctor $1800, then the doctor would
bill the patient $200, representing the balance remaining on the original bill. See id. at 793.
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amount, while permitting the physician to bill the balance to the
patient. 59 If the physician had not contracted with Blue Shield or if the
patient was not a Blue Shield subscriber, the physician would bill the
patient the entire fee, which the patient would pay directly to the
policy
physician.' The patient who had a commercial health-insurance
61
could then submit a claim for reimbursement to the insurer.
In 1965, the issue during the creation of the Medicare program was
whether the program should pay physicians directly or reimburse the
beneficiary. 6 2 To minimize the risk of patient nonpayment while
extending their patient base, physicians naturally wanted both options.?
A compromise was achieved whereby physicians could choose, at the time
of service, whether to have Medicare or the patient designated as the
payor. This was never a feature of any Blue Shield program. But similar
to the early Blue Shield plans, if a physician opted for Medicare to be the
payor, the reasonable charge, like the fee-schedule amount, had to be
accepted as payment in full. Thus, although Medicare Part B was
patterned after supplemental health insurance, the Medicare program
included this modified Blue Shield component to satisfy the opposing
views of those who wanted to impose fee schedules.?
Under Medicare parlance, a physician who accepts Medicare as the
payor (and the reasonable charge as the fee) is said to "accept
A physician may accept assignment on a patient-byassignment."'
patient, case-by-case, procedure-by-procedure, or even a charge-by-charge
basis.' Unlike a Blue Shield contract, a physician was not required or
obligated to accept the reasonable charge when treating a Medicare
patient.6 7
359. See id. at 793.
360. See Law & Ensminger, supra note 41, at 8.
361. See id. at 16.
362. MARMOR, supra note 35, at 80; See also American Medical Ass'n v. Bowen, 857
F.2d 267, 268 (5th Cir. 1988) (allowing jahysicians either to accept or to deny assignment
on a case-by-case basis).
363. See MARMOR, supra note 35, at 80.
364. The Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1842(b)(3)(B),
79 Stat. 286, 309-10, states that the carrier
will take such action as may be necessary to assure that... where payment
. . for a service is on a charge basis ... such payment will be made on the basis
of a receipted bill, or on the basis of an assignment under the terms of which the
reasonable-charge is the full charge for the service.
Id.
365. Law & Ensminger, supra note 41, at 16.
366. Id.
367. Id.
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In 1984, DEFRA created the status of the "Medicare participating
physician."' Physicians were asked to sign twelve-month, irrevocable
agreements in which they would agree to always accept assignment. As an
inducement, the participating physicians would be listed in a special
directory that would be mailed to enrollees without charge or made
available by a toll-free telephone number.' Also, an electronic claimsreceipt system would be developed that would expedite claim payment for
participating physicians. 3' Notably, by contrast, those physicians who
did not participate were prohibited from raising their fees to Medicare
patients above the actual charge for the calendar quarter beginning April
1, 1984; those physicians who knowingly and willfully violated this
prohibition
were subject to both fines and exclusion from the Medicare
371
program.
Because only about thirty percent of physicians became participating
physicians, Congress made further efforts to curtail the cost to Medicare
beneficiaries who use non-participating physicians.' Congress enacted
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA 1986),' 7 which
required all non-participating physicians to charge no more than a
maximum allowable actual charge (MAAC) for any service or procedure
performed on any Medicare patient during 1987 and thereafter. Thus, a
physician's ability to balance bill a Medicare patient, even though the
patient was the payor, was restricted because the actual charges were now
capped and monitored by HCFA.374 The MAAC was calculated by
determining either a weighted average or a median of the physician's
previous actual charges.3 7 Future MAAC determinations were indexed
to the existing prevailing charge, thereby limiting a physician's ability to
increase his fees.376 This, in effect, meant that the gap between the
reasonable charge and the MAAC would become less each year that the
MAAC was computed.
Because of this computation method, the MAAC and the reasonable
charge began to converge and would have eventually equaled each other.
368. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2306, 98 Stat. 494, 107073.
369.
370.
371.
372.
1986, 21
373.
374.
375.
376.

See id. at 1071.
Id.
See id.
Alfred J. Chiplin, The MAAC: Medicare Cost Containment Efforts in OBRA
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 351, 351-52 (1987).
Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9331(b), 100 Stat. 2018, 2019-20.
See Chiplin, supra note 372, at 351.
Id. at 352.
See id.
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At that point, all non-participating physicians would have been, in effect,
accepting assignment involuntarily because the reasonable charge would
be the maximum charge that could be billed. This would mean that
accepting assignment was federally mandated. Mandatory assignment,
however, was rejected by Congress in 1984, based on a fear that
physicians would not treat Medicare patients.'" Therefore, the MAAC
provisions of OBRA 1986, although designed to narrow the gap between
participating and non-participating physicians, did not intentionally seek
to force non-participating physicians to always accept assignment, but only
to cap their bills.37

In 1989, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
(OBRA 1989),' 7 the MAAC was replaced by the limiting charge (LC).
The LC is defined as a fixed percentage above the recognized payment
amount, which would be the reasonable charge before January 1, 1992,
and the fee-schedule amount for services furnished after January 1,
1992.11 Congress set the LC at twenty-five percent for 1991,31
twenty percent for 1992,11 and fifteen percent for 1993 and
thereafter. 31 A physician who knowingly and willfully bills above the
LC on a repeated basis is subject to sanctions of both exclusion from the
Medicare program for up to five years and a fine of up to $2000.
B. State Action
While the MAAC and the LC were Congress's sub rosa attempts at
legislating mandatory assignment, some states actively pursued such
legislation. Currently, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania have
legislation prohibiting physicians from balance billing. 3' New York has
a statute similar to the federal LC, which caps the maximum amount a
physician may charge as a percentage over the reasonable charge.38 6
Other states, such as Rhode Island, Montana, and Oregon, have notice
statutes that require physicians to notify the Medicare beneficiary, before
377. See Law & Ensminger, supra note 41, at 41-46.
378. See Chiplin, supra note 372, at 352.
379. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6102, 103 Stat. 2106, 2181 (1989).
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g)(2) (Supp. 1990).
See id. § 1395w-4(g)(2)(A).
See id. § 1395w-4(g)(2)(B).
See id. § 1395w-4(g)(2)(C).
See id. § 1395w4(g)(1).
See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
386. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 19 (McKinney Supp. 1992).
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treatment, as to whether the physician accepts Medicare assignment as
payment in full2
1. Massachusetts
Massachusetts is the only state where Blue Shield limits payments to
participating physicians by requiring them to accept program fees as full
payment.388 In 1978, the Massachusetts Medical Society (MMS)
challenged this policy in an antitrust suit against Blue Shield of
Massachusetts.89 After six years of procedural disputes-including
several motions for recusal and a certification of a state-law question to
the state's Supreme Judicial Court-the district court found Blue Shield
guilty of violating the Sherman Act by restraining trade.3" Eight months
later, the First Circuit reversed and held that Blue Shield's ban against
balance billing was not an unreasonable restraint of trade because Blue
Shield acted as a buyer of medical services for its subscribers.39 ' The
Supreme Court later denied certiorari.2
In 1985, Massachusetts enacted the first mandatory assignment
legislation in the nation." 9 The statute mandated that the Board of
Registration in Medicine
shall require as a condition of granting or renewing a physician's
certificate of registration, that the physician, who if he agrees to
treat a beneficiary of health insurance under Title XVIII of the
Social Security Act, shall also agree not to charge to or collect
from such beneficiary any amount in excess of the reasonable
charge for that service as determined by the United States
Secretary of Health and Human Services. 3"

387. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-5-901 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.099 (1991);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-22 (Supp. 1991).
388. Law & Ensminger, supra note 41, at 16.
389. See Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., No. 78-594-S, 1978 WL 1469 (D.
Mass. 1978) (dismissing complaint on grounds that balance-billing policy was authorized
by state law), vacated and remanded, 592 F.2d 1191 (1st Cir. 1979) (certifying the statelaw question to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court), tried, 582 F. Supp. 734 (D.
Mass.) (finding that policy imposed unreasonable restraint on competition), rev'd, 749 F.2d
922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985).
390. See Kartell, 582 F. Supp. at 755.
391. See Kartell, 749 F.2d at 934.
392. See KarteU, 471 U.S. 1029, 1029.
393. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 2 (West Supp. 1992).
394. Id.
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MMS brought suit against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, alleging
that the Medicare Act specifically created a right to balance bill2 5 In
support of such right, MMS proffered the statute itself, which permitted
physicians either to present an itemized bill or to accept assignment.3'
The argument was supported by the legislative history, which showed a
compromise by Congress in 1965 to create this right to balance bill by
legislating the dual-payment system. 3 The plaintiffs also relied on the
failure of the mandatory assignment bill in Congress and the enactment of
the participating physician program in 1984 as further evidence of this
right. 98 Thus, it was argued that under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, Massachusetts had impermissibly enacted a law in opposition
to the Medicare Act and that such law was void." '
The district court ruled against MMS. Judge Robert E. Keeton
decided that the Supremacy Clause is applicable only when "a state law
...stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."' Although the Medicare Act
permits balance billing, this was characterized as merely a method of
payment and not a right created by Congress.4 1 The Act evidenced no
affirmative right and created no reasonable expectations of the right to be
free from state regulation.' Therefore, the Massachusetts mandatoryassignment statute was constitutional.
On appeal, the First Circuit found that the evidence was "not
sufficient to show that Congress intended to create a right to balance
bill."' The presumption was that Congress did not intend to displace
state law.4 The court stated that "[i]f one rereads the language and
history of the Medicare Act . . .one finds them (at most) ambiguous as
to whether Congress meant merely to leave the practice of balance billing
undisturbed or meant as well to create a balance billing right that the states
could not alter."' The Supremacy Clause cannot preempt a state statute
with such ambiguity. The court found that physicians' organizations may
395. Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 637 F. Supp. 684, 700 (D. Mass.
1986), aft'd, 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987).

396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 701-02.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 687 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
See id. at 700.

402. Id.

403. Massachusetts Medical Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 793 (emphasis added).
404. See id.
405. Id. at 794.
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have won a legislative victory in 1965 by stopping a federal ban on
balance billing, but the victory did not include a federal prohibition against
state regulation of physician fees. '
Regarding the argument that DEFRA and the failed mandatory
assignment legislation of 1984 manifested a congressional intent to create
a right to balance bill, the court was reluctant to apply failed legislation
to evince Congress's earlier intent.' But even beyond that, the failed
legislation "still does not unmistakably show a congressional intent to
create the kind of indefeasible right with respect to which the
Massachusetts law might seem to be an 'obstacle.'""
The plaintiffs had asserted that physicians would stop treating
Medicare patients and, thereby, frustrate the purpose of the Act.' The
First Circuit disposed of this argument based on the fact that ninety-nine
percent of all physicians in Massachusetts participate in Blue Shield, which
had a similar ban.41 ° Also, prior to mandatory assignment,
Massachusetts physicians accepted assignment on ninety percent of all
Medicare claims, accounting for ninety-four percent of all Medicare
charges.411 Furthermore, seventy-one percent of all Medicare patients
were protected by the ban against balance billing under other insurance
plans. 1 The court concluded that these facts made it difficult to believe
that physicians were so sensitive to their fee levels that they would stop
treating the elderly or leave the state.413
2. Pennsylvania
In 1991, Pennsylvania's mandatory assignment law was challenged by
the Pennsylvania Medical Society. 4 4 Like the Massachusetts physicians,
the plaintiffs argued that the sprawling Medicare legislation evidences a
federal occupation of this field that preempts any and all state
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

See
See
Id.
Id.
See
See
See

id.
id.

id. at 795.
id.
id.

413. See id.
414. See Pennsylvania Medical Soe'y v. Marconis, 755 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Pa.),
afftd, 942 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1991).
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regulation.4 15 Summary judgment was granted to the defendants, 416 and
the medical society appealed.417
Seven months after the district court's memorandum opinion, the
Third Circuit affirmed, framing the issue as purely a question of
congressional intent. 418 Following the decision of the First Circuit, the
Third Circuit held that without clear evidence of congressional intent to
preempt any state regulation of billing practices, the state statute is valid.
The court held that "clear proof is a requirement for a finding of
preemption because courts are not eager to find that a state is precluded
from acting pursuant to its police powers." 419 Chief Judge Dolores K.
Sloviter dissented:
[t]he issue before us is not whether balance billing of Medicare
patients is good or bad, reasonable or unreasonable, social or
antisocial. It is simply whether beneficiaries and participants in a
carefully titrated federal program which has, since its inception,
sought to accommodate the views and needs of patients and
providers alike, should be compelled to rely for their protection
from what may be deemed to be excess charges on the statute and
administrative scheme Congress enacted and supervises or
whether the various states may superimpose their own, and
potentially different, schemes. 420
The dissent argued that any state scheme that permitted balance billing
either .above or below the LC levels set by Congress, or one that
completely eliminated balance billing, conflicts with congressional
intent. 421
3. New York
Three months after the Third Circuit handed down its decision, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York addressed the same
issue in Medical Society of New York v. Cuomo. 41 There, plaintiffs
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
Sept. 24,

See id. at 1308.
See id. at 1313.
See Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 842.
See id. at 847.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 861-62 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 861.
777 F. Supp. 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, No. 91-9364, slip op. 7043 (2d Cir.
1992).
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challenged a New York law' z capping the amount by which physicians
could balance bill their patients. 4' These caps were lower than the
balance-billing caps set by Congress in 1989.4 ' The plaintiffs contended
that the New York law not only was preempted by the Medicare Act but
also violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
federal constitution. I The district court, however, granted New York's
motion for summary judgment on both issues. 4'
The district court observed that the regulation of public health was an
area of traditional state power, 4" and that "the party arguing preemption
[in such a case] carries the heavy burden of showing that preemption was
the 'clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" 4' In short, the district
court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet this burden." ° Moreover, the
court rejected the argument that Congress's regulation of physician balance
billings created an unadjustable "safety valve." 1 The court stated that
there was no evidence "that Congress' safety valve was meant to bind
each and every state."42
On appeal, the Medical Society of New York challenged the district
court's finding that no preemption existed.433 The Second Circuit
affirmed the lower court's finding that Congress had not preempted state
regulation of a Medicare provider's balance billing, either expressly 4'
or impliedly.435 Moreover, the court relied on Congress's silence
following the enactment by several states of regulations proscribing or
While
limiting balance billing as tacit approval of the practice.'
acknowledging that "congressional silence provides a squishy reed upon
which to base... intent," 7 the court noted that the Third Circuit had
423. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 19 (McKinney Supp. 1992).

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
461 U.S.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

777 F. Supp. at 1159.
Id.
Id. at 1158.
Id.
Id. at 1160-61.
Id. at 1160 (quoting Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Comm'n,
190, 206 (1989)).
Id. at 1163, 1164.
Id. at 1164.
Id.
See No. 91-9364, slip op. at 7045 & n.1.
See id. at 7051.
See id. at 7054, 7059, 7060-61, 7062.
See id. at 7054-55.
See id. at 7056.
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also relied on Congressional silence in response to state regulation of
physician balance billing."
4. Summary
From the affirmance of Medical Society of New York"39 and the
denial of certiorari in Massachusetts Medical Society,' it would appear
that, on a state level, mandatory assignment passes constitutional muster.
The significant effect of mandatory assignment is that it removes the
beneficiaries as plaintiffs in any reasonable-charge litigation.", Because
balance billing is eliminated, most beneficiaries are only liable for the
twenty percent of coinsurance that Medicare does not pay. Many Medicare
beneficiaries have Medicare supplemental-or Medigap-nsurance that is
specifically designed to pay this twenty percent." Thus, because the
patient is reimbursed for 100 percent of the charges, it is highly unlikely
that a beneficiary would challenge a reasonable-charge determination.
Mandatory assignment, while removing the beneficiaries as possible
litigants, increases the likelihood of litigation brought by physicians.
Without the freedom to decide when, and from whom, to accept
assignment, physicians have more incentive to challenge the wide array of
reasonable-charge determinations. Moreover, physicians are highly
organized and have the resources to mount sustained challenges."' The
potential economic benefits of a redetermination could be substantial.'"
The sheer economic motivation might cause the AMA to accumulate and
assemble its own reasonable charges, based on the method of computation
proposed by the regulations and statutes, and to challenge the carrier's
application directly. Thus, the notable effect of Section 9305 of Tite IX
of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA
438. Id. at 7056-57 (citing Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y v. Marconis, 942 F.2d 842,
850 (1991)).
439. No. 91-9364, slip op. 7043 (2d Cir. Sept. 24, 1992).
440. Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 484 U.S. 896 (1987).
441. See generally Law & Ensminger, supra note 41, at 21 & n. 105 (noting that "the
Massachusetts Medical Society has devoted enormous resources to demonstrating that
mandatory assignment is harmful and illegal").
442. See generally id. at 15 (noting that "if fees are too low doctors may refuse to
participate" in mandatory-assignment programs).
443. See id. at 53.
444. See, e.g., Texas Medical Ass'n v. Sullivan, 875 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1989);
Association of Seat Lift Mfrs. v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1078 (1989).
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1985),' which was enacted in order to help the beneficiaries," may
instead benefit the physicians by allowing judicial review of large-dollar
disputes. The ability to challenge amount determinations, however, is
subject to whether physician-payment reform effectively has insulated the
new fee schedule from any administrative and judicial review. 7
V. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REFORM

In 1986, as part of COBRA 1985,'
Congress created the
"Physician Payment Review Commission" (Commission). The
Commission's purpose was to "mak[e] recommendations to the Congress,
not later than March 31 of each year . . . regarding adjustments to the
reasonable charge levels for physicians' services . . . and changes in the
methodology for determining the rates of payment, and for making
payment, for physicians' services."' 9 In addition, COBRA 1985
authorized the HHS Secretary to "develop a relative value scale that
establishes a numerical relationship among the various physicians' services
for which payment may be made under [Part B]."°
The Commission's recommendations, along with the development of
a resource-based relative-value scale (RBRVS), were introduced in both
houses of Congress under legislation known as the "Physician Payment
Reform Act of 1989."" The supporters of RBRVS stated that the new
system would make payments to physicians "more fair and more
workable" because payments would be made according to the cost of
providing care.' In doing so, unfairness in the Medicare system would
be eliminated so that physicians would not be discouraged "from seeing
patients in rural America or in innercities."' 3 Also, RBRVS proponents
said that the system would eliminate the current "distorted financial
incentives to over-provide expensive procedures."' Under this view,
445. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,

§ 9305(a), 100 Stat. 82, 190 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-i (1988)).

446. See 131 CONG. REC. S10,808 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985) (introduction of the
legislation by Sen. Durenberger).
447. See supra notes 359-361 and accompanying text.
448. Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9305(a), 100 Stat. 82, 190.
449. Id. § 9305.
450. Id. § 9305(b), 100 Stat. at 192 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-l(e) (1988)).
451. S. 1809, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H. 2629, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
See also 135 CONG. REC. E2142 (daily ed. June 14, 1989) (House bill); 135 CONG REC.
S14,423 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1989) (Senate submission of amendments by Sens. Durenberger
and Rockefeller).
452. 135 CONG REc. S14,423 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Rockefeller).
453. Id.
454. Id.
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RBRVS would "protect beneficiaries ..
help stabilize program costs.
. . and promote better medicine and a better distribution of medical
resources. 455
This legislation was incorporated in OBRA 1989, which was passed
on December 19, 1989.' It provided that, effective January 1, 1992,
payments for all physician services for which payment is otherwise made
on the basis of a reasonable charge will instead be based on the lesser of
(i) the actual charge for the service, and (ii) the amount determined under
the fee schedule established by the Secretary of HHS within the
parameters of the statute. 4 7 Specifically, the fee-schedule amount for all
physician services furnished in all fee-schedule areas (i.e., a Medicare
"localitX") 458 will be equal to the product of: (1) the relative value for
the service; (2) the geographic adjustment factor for the service
for the fee
459
schedule area; and (3) the conversion factor for the year.
The relative value for any service under the statute is determined
through a methodology developed by the Secretary that combines a "work
component," a "practice expense component," and a "malpractice
component."'
A work component is defined as the portion of the
resources used in furnishing the service that reflects the physician's time
and intensity in furnishing the service, which includes activities before and
after direct patient contact.4 1 The practice expense component is defined
as the portion of the resources used in furnishing the service that reflects
the general categories of expenses (such as office rent and personnel
wages but excluding malpractice expenses) comprising practice
expenses. ' 2 The malpractice component is defined as the portion of the
resources used in furnishin the service that reflects malpractice expenses
in furnishing the service.
455. Id.
456. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (1988).
457. Id. §§ 1395w-4(a)(1)(A), (B).
458. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
459. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(b)(1). The general formula to determine a fee schedule
payment is the product of the following:
Payment = RVUts X GAFtA X CF
where
RVUts = total Relative Value Units for service
GAFtA = total Geographic Adjustment Factor for fee schedule Area
CF
= uniform national Conversion Factor.
Id.
460. See id. § 1395w-4(e)(2)(A).
461. See id. § 1395w-4(c)(1)(A).
462. See id. § 1395w-4(c)(1)(B).
463. See id. § 1395w-4(c)(1)(C).
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Under this statutory scheme, the Secretary is authorized to use
extrapolation and other techniques to determine the number of relative
value units (RVUs) for physician services for which specific data are not
available, taking into account Commission recommendations and the
results of consultations with organizations representing physicians who
provide such service.' Moreover, in determining the practice expense
and malpractice RVUs, the Secretary must factor in the "base allowed
charges" for the service, defined as the national average of allowed
charges for services furnished during 1991 as estimated by the Secretary
using the most recent available data.' Thus, reasonable-charge data,
albeit not directly incorporated into the new fee-schedule methodology,
may indirec' be factored into fee-schedule amounts through the above
application.
The RVU for any service is then adjusted by a geographic adjustment
factor. 7 This factor is equal to the sum of the following three factors
determined by indices established by the Secretary:' (1) a geographic
cost-of-practice index, which reflects the relative costs of the mix of goods
and services comprising practice expenses (other than malpractice
expenses) in the different fee-schedule areas compared to the national
average of such costs; (2) a geographic malpractice adjustment factor,
which reflects the relative costs of malpractice expenses in the different
fee-schedule areas compared to the national average of such costs; and (3)
a geographic physician work adjustment factor, which reflects one-fourth
of the difference between the relative value of the physician's work effort
in each of the fee-schedule areas and the national average of such work
effort.' Each of these three factors is a product of the proportion of the
total relative value for the service that reflects the RVUs for the applicable
practice expenses, malpractice, and work component, multiplied by the
appropriate index value. 4' In other words, this factor is equal to a
weighted average of the individual adjustment factors for each of the three
464. See id. § 1395w-4(c)(2)(A)(ii).
465. See id. § 1395w-4(c)(2)(C), (D).
466. See 56 Fed. Reg. 59,502 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 415). The
regulation states:
[u]nder the formula specified at section 1848(c)(2)(C), the practice
expense and malpractice RVUs are based on historical data for practice
expense as a fraction of total physician revenue, weighted by specialty,
applied to estimate 1991 average allowed charges under the customary,
prevailing, and reasonable charge methodology.
Id.
467. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(e) (1988).
468. See id. § 1395w-4(e)(1), (2).
469. See id. § 1395w-4(e)(1)(A).
470. See id. § 1395w-4(e)(3), (4), (5).
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RVU components. 471 The law does not specify the methodology to be

used in developing these geographic practice-cost indices (GPCIs); instead,

it leaves the methodology to the Secretary's discretion.
In order to convert the geographically adjusted RVU into a dollar

amount, a conversion factor is used.4' The statute requires that the
conversion factor be budget-neutral relative to the 1991 predicted
expenditure levels so that the total payments under the fee schedule would
be the same as total payments expected in 1991 under the reasonablecharge payment methodology. 4" The statute requires the Secretary to
recommend to Congress by April 15 of each year an update to the fee-

schedule conversion factor for the following calendar year, taking into
account: (1) the percentage change in the Medicare Economic Index
(MEI) 74 for that year; (2) the percentage generally by which
expenditures for all physician services for the fiscal year ending in the

year preceding the year in which such update is made were greater or less
than actual expenditures for such services in the fiscal year ending in the
second preceding year; (3) the relationship between the percentage in (2)
for a fiscal year and the performance-standard rate of increase47
" for that

471. See 56 Fed. Reg. 59,502 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 415). Separate
GPCIs have been developed for the three components of the fee schedule. Under section
1848(e) of the Act, the GAF is equal to a weighted average of these three GPCIs. To
compute the adjustment factor:
Payment = RVUtS X [(GPCIwA X w%S) + (GPCIpeA X pe%S) + (GPCImA
X mS)] X CF
where
GPCI
= Geographic Practice Cost Index
RVUts
= total Relative Value Units for service
GPCIwA = GPCI value reflecting 1/4 of the geographic variation in physician
work applicable in the fee schedule Area
w%S
= Work percentage for Service S
GPCIpeA = GPCI value for practice expense applicable in the fee schedule
Area
pe%S
= practice expense percentage for Service S
GPCImA = GPCI value for malpractice expense applicable in the fee
schedule Area
m%S
= malpractice percentage of Service S
CF
= uniform national Conversion Factor
Id.
472. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(b)(1)(B).
473. See id. § 1395w-4(d)(2)(E)(i).
474. The Medicare Economic Index is an inflation index. See § 1395u(b)(3).
475. The Medicare volume performance standard rate of increase is another factor
which Congress and the Secretary quantify each year. As with the conversion factor update,
the Secretary is to recommend to Congress an annual performance standard rate of increase
for all physicians' services, taking into consideration (1) inflation; (2) changes in number
of enrollees; (3) changes in the age composition of enrollees; (4) changes in technology;
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fiscal year; (4) changes in either volume or intensity of services; (5)
access to services; and (6) other factors contributing to changes in the
volume or intensity of services or access to services.476 Additional
factors that the Secretary may consider are: (1) unexpected changes by
physicians in response to the implementation of the fee schedule; (2)
unexpected changes in outlay projections; (3) changes in the quality or
appropriateness of care; and (4) any other relevant factors not measured
in resource-based payment methodology. 4' Congress may choose to
enact the Secretary's recommendation, to enact some other update amount,
or not to act at all.478 If Congress does not act, the annual update is set
according to a "default" mechanism in the law. 4" This update will differ
from the Secretary's MEI-based estimate by the same percentage by which
actual expenditures in the second previous fiscal year were less or greater
than the performance-standard rate of increase for that fiscal year.'
The Medicare volume performance-standard rate of increase is another
component in the conversion factor. In 1990, it was equal to the sum of
the Secretary's estimate of the weighted average percentage increase in the
reasonable charge for physicians' services."1 HCFA expects to publish
in the Federal Register by October 31 of each year a separate notice
providing the annual updates and the performance-standard rates of
increase."

(5) evidence of inappropriate utilization of services; (6) evidence of lack of access to

necessary physicians' services; and (7) any other factor which the Secretary considers
appropriate. § 1395w-4(f).
476. See § 1395w-4(d)(2)(A).
477. See id. § 1395w-4(d)(2)(B).
478. See 56 Fed. Reg. 59,502 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 415).

479. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(d)(3)(A).
480. See id. § 1395w-4(d)(3)(B)(i).

481. See 56 Fed. Reg. 59,502 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 415).
482. The regulations present this capsulation of the methodology used in determining
the fee-schedule amount:
The work, practice expense, and malpractice percentages are the fraction
of the total RVUs for a service represented by the work, practice expense, and
malpractice RVUs, respectively; they sum to 100 percent. In effect, this statutory
formula accomplishes separate adjustment of each of the three components of the
total RVUs for each service by the value for the fee schedule area of a GPCI
specific to that component. (The statute specifies, however, that only one-fourth
of the geographic variation in physician work resource costs is to be taken into
account in the formula.) The three GPCI-adjusted RVU values are summed to
produce a total RVU value, which is converted into a dollar payment amount
specific to that service and that fee schedule area by application of a uniform,
national CF. Thus, for ease of computation and understanding, we have
transformed the original formula stated above into an algebraic equivalent as

follows:
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It would appear that the Medicare reasonable-charge payment
methodology has been transcended by Congress into a Medicare
reasonable-fee-schedule payment methodology. Although a pure theoretical
methodology might develop RVUs independent of the reasonable charge,
the fact is that HCFA's primary source of national-level claims data used
for developing the fee schedule was the Part B Medicare annual data
(BMAD) files (Procedure, Provider, and Beneficiary files). In order to use
the most complete data available, HCFA primarily used "aged" 1989
BMAD files for calculating the national CF and for calculating the practice
expense and malpractice RVUs./ Thus, the reasonable charge has been
incorporated into the new fee schedule. Moreover, the transition period,
which phases in the fee schedule, uses the reasonable charge but calls it
the "adjusted historical payment basis."'
Although "comparable service... under comparable circumstances"
and "customary charges for similar services" may no longer be a part of
the new methodology, their legal import has not been repealed by
Congress.'
Therefore, the reasonable charge, relegated to
methodological history, will maintain its posture as a term of art and thus
as a legal concept.
VI. CONCLUSION

Contrary to the original statutory language, the reasonable charge is
no longer a method that limits a physician's fee to what is usually
charged. Congress, the HHS Secretary, HCFA, and the Medicare Part B
carriers have transformed the reasonable charge into a statistic-driven
control device that regulates the fees that physicians can charge.
Essentially, the reasonable charge has been transformed into a national
reasonable fee schedule. As a legal concept, however, the reasonable
charge will remain viable until Congress strikes it from the Medicare
statutes.
The significance of both the mandatory-assignment statutes and the
national fee-schedule legislation is that they remove the beneficiary from
Payments
where
RVUwS
RVUpeS
RVUmS

=

[(RVUwS X GPCIwA) + (RVUpeS X
GPCIpeA) + (RVUmS X GPCImA)] X CF,

=

Physician work Relative Value Units for the service;
Practice expense Relative Value Units for the service;
Malpractice Relative Value Units for the service.

=

=

56 Fed. Reg. 59,502 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 415) (emphasis added).
483. See 56 Fed. Reg. 59,502 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 415).
484. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a)(2)(A)(i).
485. See j 1842(b)(3), 79 Stat. at 310.
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the payment process. Thus, beneficiaries will no longer have to contend
with the Medicare appeals process regarding amount determinations. Of
course, entitlement to coverage disputes will still involve these
beneficiaries with the system, and there will be cases in which treatment
is not performed because it is not covered by Part B. Beneficiaries,
however, will no longer be subject to the practice of balance billing, and
their major concern will be their deductible and coinsurance portions,
unpaid by Medicare.
The implementation of mandatory assignment or the transfer from a
reasonable-charge standard to a fee-schedule standard, however, does not
eliminate amount-determination disputes. The difference is that physicians,
along with other providers of service, will become the principal parties in
amount-dispute litigation. Physicians have the resources, the political
influence, and the motivation to challenge these fee-schedule amount
determinations. Moreover, they have the ability, through their
organizations, to compile and assemble their own determinations of what
a proper fee schedule should be. Thus, physicians are best able to meet
these burdens of production.
Whether the courts will want to try these amount disputes is another
issue. The case law indicates that these disputes will be divided into two
groups: (1) those challenging the method of computation of the fee
amount, along with the various adjustment factors; and (2) those
challenging the computation or application of the method. Based on the
holding of the Second Circuit, ' as well as the dicta of the Fifth'
and Sixth 4 Circuits, the latter computation challenges would have to
exhaust all administrative remedies, particularly the carrier fair hearing,
before a federal court would accept jurisdiction. These same cases,
however, may impose the fair-hearing requirement even for method
disputes, given the interchangeability of these issues. Therefore, it is likely
that fair hearings would be required for all amount-determination
challenges, whether they are reasonable-charge or reasonable-fee-schedule
challenges. But the courts may strictly construe the administrative- and
judicial-review preclusion of the Physician Payment Reform Act, thus
preventing relief for both the beneficiary and the provider of service.
Finally, it must be noted that the above analysis may fundamentally
impact health-care reform implementation in the 1990s. It is uncertain to
486. See Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468, 475-77 (2d Cir. 1989).
487. See Texas Medical Ass'n v. Sullivan, 875 F.2d 1160, 1164-70 (5th Cir. 1989).
488. See Michigan Academy of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 728
F.2d 326, 329-30 (6th Cir.) (holding that the district court did not have proper jurisdiction
to review plaintiffs' claims when administrative remedies were available), cert. granted and
vacated sub noain. Heckler v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 469 U.S. 807,
remanded sub noma. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Michigan, 751 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1984), order rescinded, 757 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.
1985), aff'd sub nom. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667

(1986).
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what extent Medicare Part B amount-determination disputes will be
relevant. However, the difference between the federal government creating
a health-insurance program for the elderly and federal occupation of the
entire national health-care industry through price control is great. Thus,
Medicare statutory and case law history may come to play an important
role in shaping America's health-care destiny.
Stewart Refler

